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Voice Over IP (VoIP) telephony is becoming widespread, and is often integrated into
computer networks. Because of this, it is likely that malicious software will threaten VoIP
systems the same way traditional computer systems have been attacked by viruses, worms,
and other automated agents. While most users have become familiar with email spam
and viruses in email attachments, spam and malicious traffic over telephony currently
is a relatively unknown threat. VoIP networks are a challenge to secure against such
malware as much of the network intelligence is focused on the edge devices and access
environment.
A novel security architecture is being developed which improves the security of a large
VoIP network with many inexperienced users, such as non-IT office workers or telecom-
munication service customers. The new architecture establishes interaction between the
VoIP backend and the end users, thus providing information about ongoing and unknown
attacks to all users. An evaluation of the effectiveness and performance of different im-
plementations of this architecture is done using virtual machines and network simulation
software to emulate vulnerable clients and servers through providing apparent attack vec-
tors.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Most households in industrialised countries started to use more advanced technology than
the old analogue telephones for communication many years ago. Even though cell phone
reception tends to be very good in most metropolitan areas, most people prefer a land
line phone or equivalent technology because of the higher costs of cell phone calls. With
the increasing availability of affordable broadband Internet and flatrate plans it is possible
to use more applications over the Internet’s IP packet-based communication. This way,
Internet telephony (Voice over IP [VoIP]) and other multimedia applications shift from
analogue and dedicated lines to using the Internet as an access technology. This can
become a security problem because current attack mitigation techniques are often based
on “a model of isolation, physically separating voice and data or using virtual LANs or
VPNs” [1].
However, these new opportunities also bring new kinds of attacks and frauds that were
unknown to traditional analogue telephony. Therefore it is important that measures and
controls are in place to protect both customers as well as the Internet and telephony ser-
vice provider from malicious hackers and financially-driven attackers. Internet security
reports show that VoIP will become a more interesting target to criminals and malicious
hackers: “Cyber criminals will be drawn to the VoIP medium to engage in voice fraud,
data theft and other scams—similar to the problems email has experienced” [2]. VoIP se-
curity surveys show that flooding and denial of service (DoS) attacks are the main threats
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Figure 1.1.: Concept of VoIP, source: fcc.gov
to telephony systems [3, 4]. However, manipulation of sessions such as hijacking as well
as passive attacks like eavesdropping can have a very strong impact on a person’s privacy
or a company’s trade secrets. These threats are of great importance right after DoS attacks
(figure 1, [5]). Recent publications of blacklists and attack patterns in the VoIP domain
provide specific details of current threats as well as which hosts and network blocks are
affected [6]. An example of a VoIP sensor running on UDP port 5060 by the Internet
Storm Center is given in figure 1.2. It shows the distribution of attacks per day over the
period of one month in 2010.
2
Figure 1.2.: VoIP scans, source: http://isc.sans.edu/diary.html?storyid=
9193
1.1.1. Security Architectures
Traditional security architectures often consist of several firewalls (defense in depth [chap-
ter 3 [7]]) and other security mechanisms to prevent attackers from eavesdropping on or
penetrating the network (Figure 1-3 [8]). However, traditional firewalls are quite limited
in what they can detect and filter (chapter 7 [9]). Application level firewalls exist that
are able to detect attacks from the outside or information leaks from the inside. Snort is
one example of an application that can detect patterns in application level network data
[10].
Each network that is used by a large number of users has weak spots that cannot be mit-
igated with firewalls alone. Classification and detailed descriptions of attacks are given
later in this thesis. Due to the number of network devices and because of the way humans
use computers, there will be an insecure password, a faulty security setting, or a vulner-
able application somewhere on the network [11]. In the end, an attacker only needs one
entry point to gain access to the whole network.
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1.1.2. VoIP
Technologies for securing the VoIP connection from one endpoint to the other are often
not feasible because a network of trust has to be established before the communication
takes place. Also, certain parts of SIP messages have to remain unencrypted (from an
end-to-end perspective, they can always be encrypted between single hops) to enable SIP
proxies to relay and redirect them. A hop-to-hop encryption can be established using the
SSL/TLS protocol [12]. However, it has been shown that man-in-the-middle attacks can
be conducted against SSL connections [13].
There are several reasons why simple and obvious solutions often do not work on large
networks with many individual users. Such solutions are the use of application layer
protocol-independent end-to-end encryption or secure protocols such as SRTP. They might
fail because of several reasons:
1. Insufficient processing power at end-devices (hardware phones),
2. missing trust model for certificates and keys, or
3. missing incompatibility because of different protocol implementations.
Also, recent developments in consumer software (particularly the Windows operating sys-
tem) have shown that a large number of logs or warning messages are not necessarily
helpful. In fact, they often cause more harm by making the user immune to warnings.
A very popular example is SSL certificate errors in web browsers that most users ignore
after a while. It is safe to say that good security should happen in the background with as
little noise and user interaction as possible.
Therefore, we propose a novel security architecture that uses well-known network and
computer security methods to detect an attack at one part of the network and improve the
protection for the whole network. The architecture only detects and mitigates a certain
class of attacks which is described later.
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1.2. Network and Information Security
Network and information security is defined by four key requirements that have to be met
at all times to guarantee that the businesses and needs of companies, service providers and
end-users are not disrupted by attacks, accidents, natural disasters, or random alteration
of data due to noise on communication channels. These four requirements of security are
(chapter 21.1 [14]):
1. Confidentiality: data must only be accessible to authorised parties
2. Integrity: data must not be modified by unauthorised parties
3. Availability: data must be available at all times
4. Authenticity: ability to verify the identity of a user
The increasing number of powerful and multifunctional mobile devices such as tablet PCs
and smartphones provide new challenges to network security. Examples for such devices
are the Apple iPad and phones with the Android operating system, respectively. The threat
to network and information security comes from two main aspects: larger user base and
limited security features.
The user base is becoming larger with the rise of mobile devices because more people
are able to connect to the Internet without needing knowledge about how to buy, connect,
and configure a traditional personal computer. Many of those users want to use emerging
services such as VoIP wherever they go. Mobile broadband Internet connections enable
people to be online even if they are not within range of a WLAN access point.
Due to the manufacturers’ goal to build smaller and lighter devices that come with many
specialised hardware components (GPS, FM radio), the processing power and variety
in input methods on those devices are very limited. This is especially true for small
smartphones that are most likely to be used in VoIP scenarios. Also, limited battery life
makes it less feasible to run traditional antivirus solutions since they rely on regular or
constant scanning of files, internet connections, and running processes [2].
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However, there is a positive aspect about mobile devices regarding protection against
network-based attacks. Most modern mobile operating systems are shipped with very
strict rules that restrict the damage a single compromised program can cause. Android
by Google is one of the most popular mobile operating systems. The operating system
separates programs by assigning each with its own unique user and group ID. As a result,
a malicious program usually cannot read or write data that belongs to another (legitimate)
program. However, programs often need extended permissions to share and modify com-
mon data. The user has to explicitly give the program permission to do so. This is often
done without much thought towards network security and Internet threats [15, 16].
1.3. Scope
The research and implementations for this thesis concentrate on protecting the customers
and users of the VoIP network. Parts of the infrastructure that are excluded from the
security architecture are:
1. The protection of VoIP backend servers, that is proxies and registrars, however they
might be used for collection of data,
2. any computers and devices that are not within the protected network,
3. physical security considerations, that is physical access control or TEMPEST, and
4. individual protection mechanisms such as anti-virus products.
1.4. Outline
The following chapters of this thesis are as follows:
chapter 2 introduces the terminology and basic knowledge necessary to understand how
VoIP works on both the client as well as the service provider side,
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chapter 3 describes common attacks on VoIP and countermeasures for single attacks,
chapter 4 puts these previously existing and basic technologies and methods into the
context of this thesis,
chapter 5 describes existing tools used to implement the testbed and the novel security
architecture,
chapter 6 describes the novel security architecture developed for this thesis,
chapter 7 explains how the novel architecture achieves its goals on a technical level,
chapter 8 describes the evaluation process and the results in terms of performance and
improvement of security,
chapter 9 concludes the thesis and gives an overview of future work in this area.
7
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2. Voice over IP (VoIP)
VoIP follows the principle of end-to-end system design by pushing the intelligence of the
network to the edges, thus taking load off the VoIP servers in the core:
The function in question can completely and correctly be implemented only
with the knowledge and help of the application standing at the endpoints of
the communication system. Therefore, providing that questioned function as
a feature of the communication system itself is not possible.
– chapter 1 [17]
This has advantages in performance and availability but it can also introduce problems,
particularly regarding the security of the system. Following are a few examples of scenar-
ios where the security is decreased by not having an intelligent network core. All of them
assume that no end-to-end security measures like encryption on the IP layer (for example
using IPsec) are in place.
1. Changing the route of packets: the end systems might only be interested in de-
livering the packets to the other client. Therefore, an attacker could perform a
man-in-the-middle attack and eavesdrop on or modify the data.
2. Malware attacks the end-user’s system: if the user’s system or entire network is
compromised, anti-virus and firewall software might be useless. This is particu-
larly true for rootkit infections. In this case, a more intelligent network core might
provide more security to the network user.
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VoIP sessions usually involve several different protocol categories that are all necessary
to transport multimedia data from one end of the conversation to the other as shown in
figure 2.1.
1. Utility protocols: low-level protocols that are not specific to VoIP, for example ARP,
IP, DHCP, or DNS.
2. Signaling protocols: describe and initiate VoIP sessions, thus helping to establish
an end-to-end media channel. This thesis focuses on the signaling protocol SIP.
3. Media protocols: carry the actual data of the conversation such as audio (voice) and
video. An examples of such a protocol is RTP.
4. Support protocols: needed for session and multimedia maintenance. SDP, RTCP,
STUN, and NTP are the most common protocols.
Call Processing 
Signaling Protocols
SIP
Support 
Protocols
RTCP, NTP, SDP
Voice
RTP
TCP or UDP UDP TCP or UDP
IP
Data Link Layer
Physical Layer
Utility 
Protocols
ARP, DHCP, DNS
Figure 2.1.: VoIP network protocol stack
It is also important to understand how SIP, RTP and their helper protocols work together
in a VoIP session. This parallel configuration of SIP and RTP and the embedded nature
of SDP are shown in figure 2.2.
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SIP
SDP RTCP
RTP
Figure 2.2.: Role of SIP and RTP protocols
2.1. History
Some of the protocols that are used within a SIP-based VoIP scenario are RTP [18], SDP
[19], and SAP [20]. These existed in different environments such as the Internet multime-
dia conferencing architecture before SIP in its current version was developed and widely
adopted (chapter 4 [21]). The first predecessors of SIP were packet-switched voice trans-
missions in 1974 and multimedia conference systems in the 1990s. One specific prede-
cessor is the Multimedia Conferencing System [22]. It could be used for “point-to-point
and multipoint teleconferences, with audio, video, and whiteboard tools.”. Its Connection
Control Protocol utilises UDP to establish connections between multimedia users.
The first version of SIP was called Session Invitation Protocol (as opposed to the current
name of Session Initiation Protocol) or SIPv1. The first IETF draft for this new multime-
dia protocol was submitted in 1996. As mentioned earlier, supporting protocols like SDP
and the protocols used in the network stack below the application layer, such as IP and
UDP, existed already. An alternative protocol, the Simple Conference Invitation Protocol
(SCIP), was proposed as an IETF draft in the same year [23]. SCIP made use of the exist-
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ing email infrastructure: it used email addresses as unique identifiers and MX records in
DNS.
The current version of SIP, version 2, is a combination of SCIP and SIPv1. Both protocols
were merged at the 35th IETF meeting and the new protocol was named Session Initiation
Protocol. SIP is still considered an unfinished draft. However, it is widely adopted as the
large number of devices and software implementing the current specification of SIP and
some of its extensions proves. Since 1999, SIP has its own working group in the IETF.
The group was split into two parts later on (2001): one for the main specification and
extensions, while the other is responsible for discussions about specific applications.
2.2. Components
2.2.1. User Agents
VoIP end-user devices such as telephones or computers are called User Agents (UAs). A
software application that is used as a VoIP telephone on a computer without the use of
dedicated hardware is called a softphone. UAs always consist of a User Agent Server
(UAS) and a User Agent Client (UAC). Server and client receive and send requests and
responses, respectively.
One problem with softphones is that they have to be on the same VLAN as the computers
they run on. These computers also run and use many other potentially vulnerable network
services, for instance sending and retrieving information to/from HTTP servers. There-
fore, it is no longer possible to separate voice and data traffic. If an attacker gets access
to a data device (for instance through phishing, malware, weak passwords, etc.) he can
instantly attack the communication channels of a network as well.
A selection of popular hardware VoIP phones are shown in figure 2.3. Figure 2.4 gives
examples of some softphones.
12
(a) Cisco phone (b) Snom 820 phone
Figure 2.3.: Hardware phones
(a) X-Lite [24] (b) Skype [25]
Figure 2.4.: Softphones
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2.2.2. Servers
Different kinds of VoIP servers are necessary to make the UAs work together. Similar to
an email address, the SIP VoIP address makes it possible to reach a person independently
from his current location. However, redirect and proxy servers are necessary to tell the
caller how to reach this person, that is tell him the IP address of the callee. Often, several
functions that are described as individual servers in the paragraphs below are combined
in one physical server.
Registrar
When a user signs in to his account he has to send a SIP REGISTER request to a registrar
server. This is also where user authentication takes place to prevent unauthorised access
to the telephony service. The registrar server then stores this information on a location
server to make it available to everyone who tries to reach a certain user on this domain.
Location Server
A location server is a database where locations of VoIP users are stored. This is necessary
to redirect callers to the correct location of the callee. For example, Alice’s registered
SIP URL could be sip:alice@company.example but the actual location of Alice
is sip:ali01@university.ac.nz between 9 am and 5 pm.
Private Branch Exchange (PBX)
A PBX switches telephone calls within a domain, for instance within the internal VoIP
network of a company. The lines that connect a PBX with another network, such as the
public switched telephone network (PSTN), are called trunk lines. Usually, PBXs also
act as registrar servers. Therefore, users have to authenticate against a cryptographic
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challenge sent from the PBX/registrar in order to be available for incoming calls, and to
be able to place calls or other types of SIP requests.
Proxy and Redirect Server
These two kinds of servers do the same thing from a user’s perspective: they redirect a
call from the server the callee is registered on (the host part of the SIP URL) to his actual
location. However, proxy and redirect servers do that in different ways. While a redirect
server tells the caller the current location or the address of the next redirect/proxy server,
a proxy server transmits all VoIP traffic through itself on behalf of the caller’s UA.
2.2.3. Session Border Controller (SBC)
Routers only inspect traffic at TCP/IP level 3 because all the information they need to
route data can be found in the IP packets. Firewalls that protect the boundaries of a
network only inspect packets at TCP/IP layers 3 and 4 (chapter 2.3 [14]). Therefore, a
mechanism is needed that provides security and services at the application layer (TCP/IP
layer 5).
SBCs are multimedia firewalls that work on the application layer. For the telecommunica-
tion provider an SBC is essential to protect the infrastructure that works in the background
by controlling the signals and media streams that try to enter the core of the network. It
also controls call admission at the border of a network. Either all (single-box setup) or
part (dual-box setup) of the SBC sits in a Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) between the public
network and the service provider’s internal network [26].
One of the functions of an SBC is to operate as a SIP back-to-back (B2B) UA, that is
it receives VoIP calls from one side of the border and establish a new connection to the
other side of it.
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Since firewalls are not aware of SIP sessions (traditional firewalls only examine traffic on
layer 4 and below), SBCs provide mechanisms to establish SIP sessions from end to end
through firewalls that perform Network Address Translation (NAT).
2.3. Protocols
2.3.1. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
SIP is used to initiate and control VoIP sessions. It uses TCP or UDP on top of the IP
protocol and is located in the application layer of the ISO/OSI network model (chapter
2.3 [14]). SIP was designed as an end-to-end protocol, which means that the intelligence
is located in the end systems and not in the core network (page 109 [21]). To exchange
information about the multimedia session, for example which video and audio codecs to
use, the Session Description Protocol (SDP) is embedded inside SIP messages. Therefore,
by embedding other protocols like SDP the functionality of a packet goes beyond what
SIP can provide alone. These basic stand-alone features of SIP are:
1. Registration and user location
2. Adding or removing participants from a session
3. Feature negotiation for a new session
4. Changing features during a session
The caller sends an INVITE message to the callee to initiate a multimedia session, for
example a VoIP call. The callee may answer with a “180 Ringing” message (provisional)
and must answer with a “200 OK” or error message. If there is no answer from the
callee, the INVITE request will eventually time out. In order to tell the other party the
specifications of the multimedia stream that will carry the actual voice signals, the caller
has to embed an SDP message inside the SIP message’s body. He will also get an SDP
message with parameters for the RTP stream from the callee [27].
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After the successful start of a session the media such as VoIP audio is sent using the
Real-time Transport Protocol. The messages transmitted by each party in a typical VoIP
session using SIP are shown in figure 2.5.
INVITE
INVITE
180 Ringing
180 Ringing
200 OK
200 OK
ACK
ACK
BYE
BYE
200 OK
200 OK
RTP media data
Figure 2.5.: VoIP conversation using SIP. The VoIP party in the middle is a SIP proxy that re-
lays SIP messages to help to locate a user. RTP media data is usually sent directly
between the end-points.
Table 2.1 shows a list of the most important, and often mandatory, SIP headers [21].
Header Description
Via Route of the packet
From Public address of sender
To Public address of receiver
Contact Contact information of sender (optional)
Call-ID Random ID of call session
CSeq Request sequence number
Allow Supported SIP requests (response to OPTIONS)
Max-Forwards Maximum number of hops
Contant-Type Type of body (e.g. SDP)
Content-Length Length of body in bytes
User-Agent Phone identifier (optional)
Table 2.1.: Important SIP headers
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Some headers contain a random string that is used for identification purposes. Even
though these additional random parameters are essential parts of the SIP specification,
they are only discussed briefly because they are generated and processed by the exiting
VoIP software used in this thesis. They do not play an important role in the concept of the
proposed security architecture to be described in 6.
The additional random parameters are used to uniquely and globally identify call relation-
ships. They are also important for detecting request loops in a network. For instance, the
From header is of the form
From: NAME <sip:EXTENSION@SERVER>;tag=RANDOM
with NAME being the full name or an alias of the person calling, EXTENSION being
either the extension number or the nickname the caller is registered under on the VoIP
server (given by SERVER), and RANDOM being a random alphanumeric string set by the
calling phone. The To header can also contain such a random tag. The SIP protocol
specifies that the tag is only to be used in peer-to-peer dialogs, that is SIP requests and
according responses.
Each request must contain one or more Via headers which must have a branch parameter
appended to the address of the routing node. Therefore, a Via header is of the form
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP ADDRESS;branch=RANDOM
with ADDRESS being the network address of the node that forwarded and routed the
request (including the original sender) and RANDOM being a random alphanumeric string
that “MUST always begin with the characters z9hG4bK” (section 8.1.1.7 [27]).
2.3.2. Session Description Protocol (SDP)
The Session Description Protocol is used to describe the parameters of a SIP session.
Its most important feature is to tell the other party or parties the specifications of the
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RTP multimedia stream, particularly the port number. Without this information, it is not
possible to establish the RTP stream since, unlike the SIP server’s port (default: 5060),
the port number is different for each session (chapter 3 [21]).
SDP messages always start with a v=0 line. Then, the sender of the message can specify
owner, subject, description, and timing parameters. The meaning of several common SDP
header lines is given in table 2.2 [19].
Header Description
v=0 Protocol version
o= Session owner
s= Session subject
i= Session description
t= Timing information
m= Media information
a= Additional information
Table 2.2.: Important SDP headers
The most important line is the one containing the multimedia type, protocol, and port
number, such as an RTP audio stream on port 20010:
m=audio 20010 RTP/AVP 0
With this information, the receiver of the message is able to connect to the sender’s RTP
stream on port 20010. After he has sent his RTP port number to the caller, both parties can
send and receive audio signals, and therefore have established a full-duplex, bidirectional
phone call.
2.3.3. Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP)
Multimedia content has to arrive at the receiver shortly after it has been sent to make sure
that the inevitable delays do not make conversation impossible. Even more important
is the correct order of packets. Therefore, each RTP packet contains a timestamp in its
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header to make sure the packets are replayed in the same order as the sender transmitted
them. The timestamp is also used to drop packets that are too old.
RTP only provides a way to transport multimedia data. The data itself has to be provided
in a way that is suitable to send it over a network, that means it has to be digitised and
preferably compressed. This is achieved by utilising codecs that are appropriate for the
job. An example of a voice audio codec is G.711 (chapter 1 [21]).
To synchronise audio and video streams the Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP)
is used [18]. It always uses the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) as the transport layer pro-
tocol (Figure 3-5, [21]). RTP multimedia streams are often unencrypted but an alternative
protocol – the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [28] – exists.
2.3.4. Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)
Network address translation (NAT) is a technique that is used for security (obscuring the
internals of a network), abstraction (not being dependant on IP addresses provided by an
external provider), and most importantly, because the number of IPv4 addresses is very
limited (both in general and per customer) [29]. However, many services have problems
running behind a router that uses NAT. VoIP using SIP is one of those services because it
uses random ports that are usually not accessible from the Internet (no port forwarding).
The STUN protocol provides a way for VoIP devices to be reachable behind a NAT router
[30] by making the UA connect to a dedicated STUN server. STUN uses UDP as the
transport protocol, and therefore has to provide its own mechanisms to guarantee reliable
delivery if necessary.
The basic operation of STUN consists of a request-response transaction using the “Bind-
ing” method. Because a STUN request passing through one or more routers performing
NAT has its source IP address – and possibly also the port – changed, the STUN server
is able to record the public IP address and port of the client sending the request. Then,
it sends this public information back to the client. This way, the client learns about its
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public IP address and port, and can send them to other hosts it is connecting to. Note that
restricted NAT only allows incoming connections to reach their targets after the internal
client has sent a packet to the target host to open the channel.
2.4. Security
2.4.1. VoIP Applications
VoIP packets are routed using the common Internet Protocol. Therefore, they are part of
the Internet traffic that connects millions of computers worldwide. For malicious hackers
it is easier to intercept or reroute VoIP packets than to tap a traditional phone line because
they can do it remotely. Possible attack vectors at different parts of the VoIP infrastructure
are given in figure 2.6. It shows two end-users connected to the rest of the VoIP network
via a firewall server on the service provider’s side. This server represents the protective
measures of the provider. However, in reality, several servers and firewall appliances are
likely to be used. The end-users’ phones are connected to the Internet via residential
gateways (RGWs) that act as a router and VoIP gateway.
Because of these security concerns, VoIP traffic should always be encrypted. One of the
most commonly used applications, Skype, uses a proprietary protocol to accomplish se-
cure communication [25]. However, due to its obfuscated nature, Skype is not the primary
choice for many companies.
Possible attacks and ways to misuse VoIP are: [31]
1. Spit (Spam over Internet telephony)
2. Eavesdropping
3. Denial of service (DoS) and flooding
4. Toll fraud
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VoIP Network
- Malformed packets
- Malicious payload
- Noise injection
- Packet manipulation
- Eavesdropping
Malicious traffic from 
other VoIP users
Figure 2.6.: VoIP attack vectors with end-users’ phones, RGWs, and service provider’s backend.
5. Noise injection and malicious traffic
While many approaches to the threat of flooding and DoS attacks have been proposed
[32, 33, 34], other threats are still a major problem to both consumers as well as service
providers. Often, security architecture approaches have to be taken to provide a holistic
protection technique against sophisticated attacks.
2.4.2. VoIP Networks
VoIP networks are difficult to keep secure because much of the network intelligence is
pushed to the edges of the network, that is to the UAs. The VoIP servers only redirect
sessions and help users to find each other. Often, an established VoIP session does not
even have to use these servers. Instead, end-users can communicate directly with each
other.
SIP provides authentication, integrity, and confidentiality by relying on existing security
mechanisms (chapter 6 [21] and section 22 [27]). One of these mechanisms is Secure
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Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) which provides public-key encryption
and digital signatures [35].
To authenticate a VoIP user, that is to make sure that the SIP message comes from the user
who is given in it, the server sends back a challenge. The user has to respond correctly
to this challenge in order to prove his identity. An attacker is still able to change parts of
the message without any of the UAs involved noticing. The only part he cannot simply
change is the challenge response because it uses a cryptographic hash function. That
means that an attacker who is able to intercept an authenticated message can change the
remaining fields of the SIP request or response in his favour. In order to prevent attacks
on the remaining parts of the message, further measures are necessary.
Integrity and confidentiality are both achieved using S/MIME. A user can sign a message
with his private key so that other users can verify the integrity of the message with the
sender’s public key. In a very similar way, a user can encrypt a message to other users by
using their public keys (chapter 21.4 [14]).
It is clear that not all headers of a SIP message can be end-to-end encrypted since a proxy
server on the route from one UA to the other may have to analyse and modify certain
header lines, particularly the Via lines.
When looking at the security between an end-user and an ISP, connections are relatively
safe from wiretapping due to the widespread use of fiber optics instead of copper wires
(chapter 2 [36]).
Because of the small number of different SIP and SDP messages, normal (anomaly-free)
VoIP network traffic can be easier to predict than legitimate generic network traffic (a
mix of different applications). Therefore, it is easier to detect anomalies and malicious
behaviour in isolated VoIP networks.
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3. Attacks and Countermeasures
This chapter describes several techniques to exploit flaws in the SIP protocol, one of
the other protocols used in a typical VoIP session, the VoIP server software, or the UA
software. Additionally, mitigation techniques against these flaws or the resulting attacks
are described. The purpose of this section is to give an overview of what is possible in a
SIP-based VoIP environment from the attacker’s perspective as well as from the network
administrator’s and security expert’s point of view.
A look at previous and related work that surveyed or monitored the security of production
VoIP systems shows that threats like tool fraud, identity theft, denial of service attacks,
and SPIT calls are a problem for most service providers [1, 6].
3.1. Introduction
Table 3.1 categorises common attacks and threats into a social and a technical category.
Only those attacks and threats that are likely to occur in a VoIP scenario are listed. Specific
attack scenarios are described in the following sections.
3.2. Social Threats
As with any large interconnected community (user base), it is relatively easy for an at-
tacker to get information about users in an anonymous way. The collected information
25
Social Technical
Identity theft Flooding attack
Credential theft through phishing Credential theft through evesdropping
Rerouting Rogue servers (Man in the Middle)
— Software crashes (DoS)
— Network congestion (DoS)
— Brute force (passwords)
Table 3.1.: VoIP attack methods
makes it possible to target a specific user in a way that does not appear to be an attack.
The technique of attacking someone using social skills and additional information about
a specific target is called social engineering.
Social threats are dangerous not only to VoIP users but threaten all Internet users, in
particular those with accounts on social networking websites and other online services.
The following sections describe various possible social attacks against VoIP users and
their consequences.
3.2.1. VoIP Phishing (Vishing)
As with all new technology, it does not take long until criminals discover the new services
and try to turn them into money. Even though Phishing is not an attack on computer
systems itself, it nevertheless gives the attacker access to it by using social engineering
techniques on legitimate users of the system. Often, a user is tricked into believing that a
legitimate party, such as his VoIP service provider, needs information about his account
to enable or restore certain functionality. If the user enters his credentials into a fake login
form or sends it directly via email, the attacker can collect this information and use it to
log on as the specific user.
The collected information can then be used to conduct fraudulent activities in the name
of the victim. If money services are directly connected to the user’s account, it is easy
for the attacker to achieve a financial gain. A common scenario in VoIP environments is
to make a user call premium numbers which usually cost several dollars per minute. The
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premium numbers are operated by the criminals and provide financial income with each
call.
3.2.2. Rerouting and Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
If a user can be tricked into configuring his phone so that it routes packets through the
attackers network space, all or parts of his communication are revealed and potentially
compromised, depending on the security of the network (authentication only or integrity
checks and encryption). In a process similar to the previous section (Vishing), an attacker
could send emails that resemble service emails from the VoIP service provider to end-
users. These emails could include directions to change the address of a VoIP proxy server.
Users that follow these fake instructions will fall victim to man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attacks.
3.3. Technical Threats
This section describes technical threats that can have a serious effect on users and net-
works even if they are protected against the attacks mentioned in the previous section.
These attacks often use a lot of resources to achieve sending malicious data with high
frequency.
3.3.1. Denial of Service
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack renders the target system useless. Possible outcomes
of DoS attacks are denial of access to information, applications, computer systems, or
communication channels (chapter 2 [8]). This can be achieved in many ways, for example
flooding the VoIP network with SIP messages or changing the registration of VoIP phones
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on the registrar server. The latter can also be used to redirect VoIP traffic to non-legitimate
users (for specific attacks see chapter 12 and 13 [37]).
An important subsection of DoS attacks are Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) net-
work attacks (chapter 7 [38]). In principle, DDoS attacks work exactly like DoS attacks
but utilise more than one single source to send malicious packets over the network to the
victims’ computer systems. Often, attackers use other computers without permission by
using covert malware, also called trojan horses or rootkits (see below). These infected
computers are called zombies or bots. A bot is controlled by a master (the original at-
tacker) and all bots that belong to a master form a botnet.
3.3.2. Circumventing Password Authentication
Given a large enough user group, an attacker will almost always be able to find a weak
password. A weak password could be either too short so that it can be cracked with a brute
force attack, too easy to guess (’1234’), or a word that can be found in a password dictio-
nary. Recent research and publications by password recovery companies have shown that
many users use very simple and predictable passwords, often on many websites simulta-
neously [39, 40] (see figure 3.1).
Therefore, authenticating clients and servers before the communication starts is a very
limited method to ensure that only legitimate end-points communicate with each other. It
can only provide a basic first step towards a secure architecture.
3.3.3. Rogue SIP devices
Endler and Collier demonstrated several ways to insert a rogue SIP UA or server into
a VoIP network (chapter 6 [37]). To establish these, VoIP UAs have to be tricked into
registering to a rogue registrar or redirecting all traffic through a rogue proxy. Therefore,
either a social engineering attack has to be done before the rogue server is set up, or a
28
1 1111 111111 12 123
123123 1234 12345123456 1234567
12345678 123456789 1234567890
123mudar 123qwe 1q2w3e
1q2w3e4r 1q2w3e4r5t 1qaz2wsx
654321 abc abc123
abcd1234 adm admin
admin123 administrator alex
amanda andrew angel apache asdfgh
backup  changeme chocolate darwin
david demo ftp ftpuser guest
guest123 http info  internet johnlinux mail master michael
mike mudar123 mysql network  news
no oprisor1975 oracle p@ssw0rd
pa55w0rd pass passw0rd
passwd password
password123 paul postgres postmasterq1w2e3 q1w2e3r4 qazwsx qwe123qwerty r00t redhat richardroot root123 sales samba
server setup shell student sysadmin
temp test test123 teste
tester testing testuser tooruser web webadmin webmaster
www www-data
Figure 3.1.: Popular SSH attack passwords tag cloud: font size relates to number of occurrences
[41]
vulnerability in the protocols or applications involved has to be exploited to change the
route of packets without the user’s consent.
3.3.4. Kernel-mode and Firmware Rootkits
A special type of malicious software that is supposed to evade detection by the targeted
host or other devices is called a rootkit (chapter 5.1 [42]). This goal is achieved by mod-
ifying essential system executable binaries or libraries in order to hide the existence of
the rootkit. Usually, this involves gaining root or administrator rights through a process
called privilege escalation. Since the operating system’s kernel or even some lower level
firmware gets infected, it is difficult to detect the rootkit from the same operating system.
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However, modified binaries can be detected by booting the system into a different rescue
system and scanning the memory and storage space of the infected system (Introduction
[43]).
Guillaume Delugré recently demonstrated that a rootkit can be directly installed to a net-
work card by modifying its firmware [44]. A similar approach of reverse engineering is
also possible for VoIP hardware phones. This is particularly true because more and more
devices run a Unix-based embedded operating system that is similar to common desk-
top and server systems. Therefore, a user’s telephone or computer that runs a softphone
cannot be trusted even if the operating system, firmware, and (in the case of a personal
computer) applications, antivirus and firewall software are up to date.
3.3.5. Fuzzing
Fuzzing is also known as robustness testing or functional protocol testing (chapter 11
[37]). The technique is used to find software and protocol vulnerabilities. Instead of
sending predefined input to a service like a SIP server, traffic is generated according to
rules. Commercial tools usually come with thousands of tests preloaded. For example,
the Codenomicon SIP test tool [45] comes with 35,000 test cases including INVITE,
OPTIONS, and REGISTER SIP messages.
3.3.6. Malicious Traffic in the SIP Message Body
The SIP protocol specification [27] only specifies the content of the SIP message line and
the SIP headers. The message body on the other hand can contain any arbitrary data. This
data can even be encrypted since the SIP message body is only used by the end points
of a session. Besides the obvious example of SDP messages, there are other use cases.
Since several message bodies can be contained in one SIP request, a user could send an
image as well as an SDP message inside a SIP INVITE request. It is then up to the UAS
to interpret both bodies (the SDP message as well as the image data).
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Considering the many different VoIP clients and the amount of different features (like
sending an image with an INVITE request), it is very likely that software bugs will enable
a malicious hacker to crash the UA or introduce malicious software into the operating sys-
tem. Since modern hardware phones are computers with an embedded operating system
too, it does not make a difference if the target is a traditional computer with a softphone
or a hardware phone.
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4. Related Work
A lot of work has been done on VoIP security in the past. This chapter describes public
research results on VoIP. An important subsection of this research is on network attacks
and countermeasures.
4.1. VoIP Attack Surface
Recent Internet security threat reports and articles from security researchers [2, 46, 47]
show that the VoIP attack surface is getting bigger. This is both due to more people using
VoIP services as well as more malicious hackers and criminals focusing on attacking these
new telephony users.
The Australian chapter of the Honeynet Project deployed VoIP honeypot sensors (called
phoneynet) to look for scans and attacks in the Australian address space in 2009 [46].
VoIP scans only occurred every few weeks, originating from all over the world and were
far less frequent than traditional computer virus and DDoS attacks in the same address
space.
This changed in 2010 as VoIP scans became more and more common [48]. [47] describes
detailed results of 2083 VoIP events collected over the period of nine months on the
deployed ADSL-based honeypot. The results of the analysis show that most malicious
VoIP traffic comes from China (over 63%). This does not necessarily indicate that the
location of the attackers is in China but rather that there are many compromised computer
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systems in China that are used to attack VoIP systems worldwide. The second largest
group of attacks originated from an unknown location which “was composed of either
IP numbers that did not result in a resolution in the geographical IP databases as it was
unknown or was a spoofed unassigned IP number.”. The scanning hosts were identified
as Asterisk-based (see chapter 5), SIPVicious, and sundayddr (a modified SIPVicious
scanner). The similarity between the SIP messages used in these new scans that emerged
in the second half of 2010 and the ones created by existing VoIP security tools was also
noted by the developer of SIPVicious. He explains that one of the techniques used to
bypass network security measures is “distributing the scans across different IP addresses”
[49]. This shows the need for an event correlation mechanism in a VoIP network which is
central to the proposed security architecture to be described in chapter 6.
4.2. Protocol Improvements
Several protocols exist that are aimed at making VoIP communication secure. The Secure
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) uses modern encryption standards to provide “con-
fidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the RTP traffic and to the
control traffic for RTP” [28]. Another example of an improved VoIP data protocol, ZRTP,
was developed by the creator of the data encryption program PGP [50]. However, in the
case of both protocols, all endpoints have to support the additional or enhanced protocol
version. This cannot be guaranteed, in particular for older hardware phones.
4.3. Attack Countermeasures
4.3.1. Denial of Service and Flooding Attacks
Lee and Hunt propose “a novel method to address the protection necessary to mitigate
flooding attacks in VoIP networks” by extending the SIP authentication method and in-
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troducing a firewall nonce checking mechanism [32]. The firewall creates a nonce and
sends it back to the calling UA. The UA then resends its INVITE request including the
hashed response which is calculated using the client’s credentials and the nonce from the
firewall. The firewall does not check the response but only the nonce. The response is
simply forwarded to the SIP server that the client originally attempted to connect to. The
validity check of the nonce in the firewall uses essential SIP headers that are critical to
security. These headers are To, From, Via, Call-ID and CSeq. This way, if the attacker
tries to change the values of these fields, the nonce becomes invalid. Because the authen-
tication is request by the firewall in a stateless manner, the attacker cannot exhaust the
VoIP server.
VoIP IDS can detect and block flooding attacks, for example by using finite state ma-
chines (FSM) to detect malicious SIP requests as proposed by Sengar et al. [51]. This
way, unusual and potentially malicious SIP messages can be detected at the IDS and fil-
tered before they reach any important SIP equipment. The authors of the paper propose a
protocol-specific IDS (called vIDS) “to detect any deviation from normal system behav-
iors, and hence, capture unknown attacks.”.
4.3.2. Eavesdropping
Apart from the VoIP protocol improvements mentioned above, mechanisms that protect
the users confidentiality can be installed in other layers of the network stack, mainly in
the IP protocol. Virtual private networks (VPNs) can provide a secure tunnel between
two end-points. One example of a more secure IP variant is IPsec [52] and another (open-
source) VPN implementation is OpenVPN [53].
4.3.3. End-user Protection
Charney [54] proposes a large-scale collective defense mechanism against computer mal-
ware by adopting known public health models. He points out that such a quarantine
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technique can only work if malware can be detected easily and reliably. While many en-
terprises and government organisations already have the staff and technical capabilities to
realise quarantines for computer systems, most Internet users are not protected by such
malware countermeasures.
As Schneier [55] points out, Internet quarantines pose a risk to unrestricted and unlimited
access to the Internet. Missing software patches, insecure operating systems or appli-
cations that fail to provide a valid certificate could become indicators that would put a
computer into quarantine. It is clear that many privacy and legal concerns make the im-
plementation of a quarantine system difficult.
4.4. Event Correlation and Anomaly Detection
Rieck et al. [33] describes a self-learning intrusion detection system for VoIP systems
that can detect any SIP traffic, that is session setups and tear down messages, that deviate
from previous training data.
Different approaches to detect whether a stream of data contains telephone voice have
been given by Zissman [56]. Such a mechanism is needed to detect malicious RTP streams
that pretend to contain audio. However, attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in RTP appli-
cations by sending content different from the expected audio are very rare.
Rules to detect some SIP attacks have been published for the open-source intrusion de-
tection software Snort [57].
Distributed approaches to detect anomalous and malicious activity are an important and
large field of ongoing research. The technique of offloading processing and analysis of
potential malware to network services can be essential to devices with limited resources
such as mobile platforms [58, 16]. Within this distributed security architecture, additional
services such as honeypots have been implemented to help with classification of malware
[59].
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4.5. VoIP Network Simulation
The simulation framework OMNeT++ in combination with the extension INET (as de-
scribed in chapter 5) provides all the mechanisms needed for a VoIP network except VoIP
application protocols. VoIPTool is an extension for INET that provides modules that sim-
ulate realistic VoIP data transmission [60]. However, it does not contain any modules for
the SIP protocol.
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5. Tools
This chapter describes the tools that have been used inside the testbed to evaluate attacks
against VoIP systems and their appropriate countermeasures. Whenever possible, open-
source tools were used. This is for two main reasons: the first is cost-efficiency in an
academic research environment. The second is that generally open-source programs are
easier to deploy in heterogeneous networks because it is possible to adapt the software to
the specific requirements of the environment.
The first two sections describe the tools used to set up the testbed and the network sim-
ulation for security and performance tests (see chapter 8 on evaluation and results). The
software that is used inside this testbed to achieve the goals of the security architecture
(see chapter 6) are described afterwards. A list of version or build numbers for the soft-
ware used for this thesis is given towards the end of the chapter. The chapter ends with a
discussion of unsuitable tools, that is software or hardware that is not used in the experi-
ments conducted within the security architecture testbed or network simulation.
5.1. Testbed Setup
In the first step, the novel security architecture described in this thesis has to provide
results from a proof-of-concept setup using only a very limited number of end devices.
This is done to ensure that the implementation of the architecture and communication
between its components works as designed.
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5.1.1. VMware Workstation
Virtualisation has made the development and evaluation of many different types of soft-
ware, from operating systems to graphical user interfaces and even malware, much easier.
VMware Workstation allows a user to clone existing virtual systems (VMware images).
Therefore, a developer can save a lot of time setting up identical or nearly identical op-
erating systems compared to using physical computers. Additionally, the internal state
of these images can be observed for malicious activities and reset to a healthy state if
necessary.
5.1.2. Virtual Machines
Since most of the tools, clients, and servers mentioned below either run solely on Linux
or are easiest to install and manage on a Unix-based system, a small variety of Linux
distributions has been installed on virtual machines to implement the proof-of-concept
architecture:
• Debian Linux 5.0.4: very lightweight distribution (used for the Internet gateway)
• Asterisk NOW: based on CentOS 5.3 (used for the Asterisk VoIP PBX)
• Backtrack 4 final: based on Debian 5.0, includes many network security tools such
as nmap and Wireshark (used for all end-users and attacking clients)
5.2. Simulation
In order to evaluate the performance of the security architecture concept in a large VoIP
network, a simulation framework is used. Additionally, a controlled simulation environ-
ment makes it possible to develop and deploy new features as well as to collect data from
different sensors across the simulated network in a quick and controlled process.
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5.2.1. OMNeT++
OMNeT++ is a discrete event simulation framework written in C++. It can simulate
different types of networks including communication between computers. Other possible
applications are on-chip and queueing networks [61]. Additional projects exist that extend
OMNeT++ with protocols from the TCP/IP stack and realistic VoIP data functionality [62,
63]. Many of those extensions have been written and used at universities all over the world
[64, 65, 66]. Therefore, it is safe to say that OMNeT++ is widely used within academic
environments. However, [67] discovered significant differences between simulations and
testbeds in wireless networks. This underlines the importance of the testbed as a first step
towards the novel security architecture.
Figure 5.1.: OMNeT++ network simulation graphical user interface [61]
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5.2.2. INET
INET is a framework for TCP/IP communication that is built on and integrates into OM-
NeT++ [62]. It provides a set of simple and compound modules that resemble common
devices and protocols found in a basic computer network environment. Examples of pro-
tocols which are realised as simple modules are Ethernet, IP, TCP and UDP. Compound
modules that consist of protocol and utility modules are TCP/IP hosts, an Ethernet switch,
an Ethernet hub, and routers (IPv4 and IPv6). Many other frameworks are built on top of
INET to simulate peer-to-peer networks or mobile and ad-hoc environments. INET does
not include any security-related modules such as firewalls or IDS. It also is not aware of
application level protocols. Therefore, INET as it is provided by the open-source project
cannot understand or act on VoIP traffic.
5.3. Traffic Generator
In order to test the performance and security of the security architecture, several methods
and tools have been used to generate ordinary network traffic as well as specially crafted
VoIP traffic. Scapy is a Python program for interactive network packet manipulation [68].
A trivial example of a Scapy command to generate and send an incomplete SIP packet as
it might occur in an OPTIONS request scan is:
>>> s = "OPTIONS bob SIP/2.0\n"
>>> p = IP(dst="192.168.50.3")/UDP(dport=5060)/s
>>> send(p)
Scapy is not suitable for fast performance tests against a network. Since it is written in
Python and uses several layers of abstraction, execution speed is slower and the memory
usage is higher than that of other tools (chapter 6.3, [69]). The tool can either be used
in an interactive mode by a network analyst or software developer, or its libraries can be
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used inside Python programs. The latter method has been used to write scripts that send
messages after a certain event in the event correlation engine has been triggered.
Figure 5.2 shows a screenshot of Scapy being used to generate a simple SIP OPTIONS
request. All parameters of the SIP and underlaying protocols can be spoofed.
Figure 5.2.: Scapy sending an incomplete SIP packet using the Backtrack 4 Linux distribution
5.4. Scanning and Enumeration
Basic tools such as ping, nmap (a port scanner), or captured network traffic (for example
using Wireshark) are usually used to determine the state of a network in case of problems
that may occur. However, in a VoIP environment, specialised tools that make use of the
SIP protocol in the application layer can provide a more detailed look at the situation.
For example, while a tool like ping is enough to determine if a host is up and running, a
“VoIP ping” can query specific information from an active SIP device. This can become
an important issue if SIP servers are configured to run on a different port than the default
one (5060).
While, in principle, it is possible to generate all necessary diagnostic SIP messages using
a traffic generator like Scapy, an easier and more reliable solution is to use existing VoIP
security software.
43
The VoIP security suite SIPVicious by Sandro Gauci consists of several tools with differ-
ent purposes [57]. The main tools are:
1. svmap: scans given IP addresses for the presence of a SIP server
2. svwar: identifies working extensions on a PBX
3. svcrack: tries to brute-force digest authentication passwords
5.5. VoIP Infrastructure
5.5.1. Asterisk
According to the website of the Linux distribution that is used in the security architecture
testbed for the VoIP PBX, AsteriskNOW [70], Asterisk and its extensions can be used in
many different scenarios. A few examples of applications are given below:
1. VoIP and Skype gateway
2. Voicemail system
3. Call recorder
4. Fax and speech server
A graphical user interface accessible through a web browser can be used to configure the
parameters of Asterisk without the need to edit text configuration files, which is more
error prone than a guided installation and configuration interface.
Through a manifold of add-ons or modules it is possible to extend Asterisk with many
new features including basic SBC functionality.
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5.5.2. SIP Phones
Closed and open-source softphones have reached different maturity levels. In terms of
features offered to the user through the graphical user interface, the following ascending
order among a selection of free softphones can be established:
1. Linphone: Open source, supports SIP
2. KPhone: Open source, supports multiple identities
3. Twinkle: Open source, multiple phone lines and automatic features such as call
redirection
4. Skype: Closed source, proprietary protocol, supports calls to PSTN via external
commercial servers and video chats
In this work, only KPhone and Twinkle are used because they are included in most mod-
ern Linux distributions and offer the functionality needed to conduct the experiments.
Linphone is only used to evaluate the responses to a specific SIP request from different
phones (see table 6.1) to obtain a more comprehensive picture.
5.6. Honeypots and Honeynets
In order to get statistics on the amount of VoIP traffic, both legitimate and malicious, a
VoIP module for the low-interaction honeypot dionaea [71] was developed. Another VoIP
honeypot with a different approach (it acts as a SIP phone and connects to a SIP registrar
server that has to be present on the network) is Artemisa [72]. Dionaea was used instead
of a dedicated honeypot software because it is already in use by many honeypot security
researchers all over the world. Once the VoIP module was developed and integrated, it
could be deployed worldwide with the rest of dionaea’s source code.
Malicious hackers and operators of botnets also started using honeypots for their purposes
[73, 74]. In this case, the botnet client software sets up a fake administration panel that is
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accessible with a web browser and susceptible to SQL injection [75] and weak passwords
(see chapter 3). It then presents random “malware statistics” to the authenticated user.
The purpose of this mechanism is to provide security analysts and malware competitors
with false information. Additionally, connections from security analysts and competitors
can be logged and blocked in the future.
5.6.1. Dionaea
[The intention behind dionaea] is to trap malware exploiting vulnerabilities
exposed by services offered to a network, the ultimate goal is gaining a copy
of the malware.
– Dionaea website [71]
Dionaea exposes different services such as FTP (port 21), HTTP (port 80), SMB (port
445), and SIP (port 5060) to the network. It uses libemu to safely execute downloaded
malware and record all system calls during the emulation process. Afterwards, a honey-
pot module can analyse the calls to determine the type and version of the malware. The
honeypot modules for the protocols are written in the scripting language Python [76] in
order to achieve flexibility and quick development cycles. The core components of dion-
aea are written in C. In order to call C functions directly from Python, a library wrapper
is needed. Cython [77] is used to interface C data structures like the connection.
Dionaea offers a variety of ways to log the actions taken by an attacker: traditional text
file logs, logging to an SQLite database which allows flexible and easy querying, and
logging to a remote XMPP server. The latter is also used to exchange information and
downloaded malware with other honeypots.
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5.6.2. VoIP Module
Like the other modules, the VoIP honeypot module is written in Python. It exposes ba-
sic services of a SIP server such as responding to REGISTER, OPTIONS, INVITE, BYE,
and CANCEL requests and establishing RTP voice multimedia sessions in response to IN-
VITE requests. All the incoming and outgoing information of SIP requests and responses
are logged to an SQLite database through dionaea’s logging interface. Optionally, a com-
plete binary dump of the RTP stream can be created as well. The relevant code sections
are given in appendix E.
Since sophisticated and targeted attacks on VoIP users are not very common yet, the main
goal of dionaea’s VoIP module is to analyse the activity of scans and DoS attacks on
large networks such as the Internet. Therefore, it does not operate on the incoming data,
for example by analysing it for known malware signatures or by executing it in a safe
sandbox. However, logged events of SIP scans alone can provide useful input data for a
security architecture if they are correlated properly.
Figure 5.3 shows a UML class diagram of the VoIP honeypot module within dionaea.
Some of dionaea’s core classes such as the connection class that is used by all hon-
eypot services are written in C and exposed as a Python class to the individual honeypot
modules. Sip and RtpUdpStream both inherit from the connection class in order
to provide services to the network. While there is only one instance of Sip which always
listens on UDP port 5060, RtpUdpStream objects can exist many times. Each success-
ful (authenticated) SIP INVITE request will cause the creation of a new SipSession
and RtpUdpStream instance. The SIP session data structure is used to store parameters
for each call individually, such as RTP port and authentication status. For most of the
incoming SIP messages, the one instance of the Sip class merely forwards them to the
correct SipSession instance. The key used to identify the correct session object is the
Call-ID SIP header mandatory for each SIP message. A BYE or CANCEL request will
delete the SIP session from memory if it has been created previously.
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+ connection
+handle_io_in(data : string) : int
+handle_close() : void
+handle_io_out() : void
+ Sip
+sip_INVITE(requestLine : string,headers[1..*] : string,body : string) : void
+sip_ACK(requestLine : string,headers[1..*] : string,body : string) : void
+sip_OPTIONS(requestLine : string,headers[1..*] : string,body : string) : void
+sip_BYE(requestLine : string,headers[1..*] : string,body : string) : void
+sip_CANCEL(requestLine : string,headers[1..*] : string,body : string) : void
+sip_REGISTER(requestLine : string,headers[1..*] : string,body : string) : void
+sip_RESPONSE(requestLine : string,headers[1..*] : string,body : string) : void
-checkForMissingHeaders(headers[1..*] : string,madatoryHeaders[1..*] : string) : bool
+sendto(s : string,host : string,port : int) : void
+handle_io_in(data : string) : int
-sessions [0..*] : SipSession
+ RtpUdpStream
+handle_close() : void
+handle_io_in(data : string) : int
+handle_io_out() : void
+close() : void
-startRecording() : void
+ SipSession
+handle_INVITE(headers[1..*] : string,body : string) : void
+handle_ACK(headers[1..*] : string,body : string) : void
+handle_CANCEL(headers[1..*] : string,body : string) : void
+handle_BYE(headers[1..*] : string,body : string) : void
-authenticate(headers[1..*] : string) : void
-state : SipState
+sipConnection : Sip
-rtpStream : RtpUdpStream
<<enumeration>>
SipState
NO_SESSION
SESSION_SETUP
ACTIVE_SESSION
SESSION_TEARDOWN
 
1 1
 
1
0..*
Figure 5.3.: UML class diagram of SIP honeypot module: connection is part of dionaea and
written in C, it exposes an interface to Python using Cython
5.7. Traffic Analysis
Traffic analysis tools examine all or part of the data passing a network node in order to
condense the information contained or to filter the data for certain events or signatures.
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) scan passing network data for pre-defined signatures or
rules. Every hit is logged to a log file or database. One example for an open-source IDS
is Snort [10]. IDS potentially produce many hits per minute or even per second depending
on the attack surface and size of the network. Therefore, the information provided by the
IDS has to be further condensed (and preferably not reduced) before it can be used by
human analysts or for automatic decisions.
An example of a Snort rule detecting INVITE flooding attacks looks like this:
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alert ip any any -> any 5060
(msg: "INVITE scan"; content: "INVITE"; depth: 6;
threshold: type both, track by_src, count 30, seconds 3;
sid: 500001;)
More SIP-specific rules are available on the Snort Community Rules website [10].
This results in an alert written to Snort’s log file:
[**] [1:500001:0] INVITE scan [**]
[Priority: 0]
08/20-01:44:42.603524 192.168.50.3:53 -> 192.168.50.5:5060
UDP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:1 IpLen:20 DgmLen:45
Len: 17
5.8. Event Correlation
The aforementioned necessary processing of the information provided by an IDS is done
by event correlation engines. A simple and lightweight open-source event correlator is
SEC [78]. The correlation decisions are based on predefined rules that match log events
using optional time intervals. This is also useful to prevent so-called false positives due
to single and isolated events such as failed authentication or a wrong entry on a blacklist.
Also, correlating events in real-time opens up the possibility to adapt defense mechanisms
as new threats and variations thereof occur.
SEC uses text-based rule files with key=value pairs in each line. Among many others,
SEC supports the following most important rule types. The matching pattern used for
these rules is usually given as a regular expression.
Single Triggered when a log entry matches the pattern. Similar functionality to an IDS
examining network traffic.
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SingleWithThreshold Triggered when a log entry matches the pattern and the pattern
has occurred a certain number of times (threshold) within a given time window.
A log entry is also called an event. It does not have to originate from a text log file, even
though it is the most common form of primary input. Certain rules can trigger further
events as described below. These events can then be processed the same way the first
primary events from log files did.
The following list describes actions that can be taken when a rule matches an incoming
log entry. Actions can be combined sequentially, for example creating a new SEC event
and writing to SEC’s log file.
event Creates a new event which can be processed by rules positioned later in the chain.
This action is useful for normalising incoming log file entries.
create Creates a new context which will exist for a given amount of time. Contexts are
useful in order to avoid processing events in certain situations. For example, a context can
be set for the night to ignore matching rules during that time of the day.
add Adds an entry to an internal table. This table can be used to store information for a
limited time, and print it to the screen when another event matches.
write Write an arbitrary string to a given log file. The string can reuse elements of the
matched pattern.
shellcmd This type of action is needed to pass results from SEC on to other programs.
For example, it can be used to send a command to another computer on the network via
SSH.
5.9. Software Versions
The exact version or built numbers of the software used to run the experiments of this
thesis are given in table 5.1.
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Software Version
VMware Workstation 7.0.0, build-203739 (on Windows XP)
OMNeT++ 4.1 (on Debian GNU/Linux)
INET for OMNET 4.0/4.1, build 20100723
GNUplot 4.4
Snort 2.8.0.2, build 75
SEC 2.5.3
Scapy 2.0
Asterisk 1.4.24
KPhone 4.2
Linphone 2.1.1
Twinkle 1.2
Table 5.1.: Versions of software used for this thesis
5.10. Unsuitable Tools
Apart from the software mentioned above, other tools have been considered or might
appear suitable to be included in this thesis. The reasons for the decisions against them
are given now. A reason that applies to all categories of software is that of scope: this
Master’s thesis concentrates on a specific scenario and therefore can not utilise or compare
all available possibilities.
5.10.1. Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
Several options for open-source SIEM software exist such as OSSIM and Cyberoam
iView [79, 80]. However, after an examination of their feature list and plugins, both ex-
emplary tools only aggregate incoming data without providing solutions for existing or
quickly developing malicious activities on the network. In other words, their functional-
ity is confined to generating reports and raising alarms if thresholds are exceeded. Also,
no VoIP-specific features or rules are supplied. Nevertheless, VoIP-specific information
management and event management processes could be implemented in one of the avail-
able open-source SIEM systems.
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5.10.2. Hardware Phones
Because it is impossible to test all available varieties of VoIP SIP phones, the attempt has
been made to abstract the end-user’s phone as much as possible. This can be achieved
by using modular and extendible SIP clients with a programming interfaces for common
scripting languages such as Python.
Open-source softphones are much easier to modify and extend than the firmware of hard-
ware phones. Also, they can be monitored more closely from the computer they are
running on. A hardware phone usually only exposes the network traffic that is going in
and out of it.
5.10.3. Commercial Security Software and Appliances
Commercial software, particularly in the information and network security domain, is of-
ten more advanced and receives quicker updates than free software. A common business
model for security software developers is to distribute the core component under a free li-
cense (such as the GNU Public License) and provide support and updates for professional,
that is paying, customers.
This thesis tries to evaluate the performance and suitability of open-source software in
large networks. Since the attack scenario is very specific and built in a controlled lab
environment, it does not rely on the latest security updates to discover viruses or malicious
network traffic. Also, a research project like this can be more flexible and independent
when it is not tied to a specific vendor or product. Covering a wide range of commercial
products can cost a lot of money when acquiring products or committing to commercial
updates, which is not justifiable for a research project of that scope.
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6. A Novel VoIP Security
Architecture
This chapter describes the main work of this thesis, the novel security architecture for a
large SIP-based VoIP network. First, a brief outline of the motivation for such an archi-
tecture is given, which is based on the work of the previous chapters. Then, the concept
of the security architecture is explained in detail. Scenarios to describe the function of the
architecture in certain situations are given at the end of the chapter. The techniques and
methods used to implement the specific parts of the architecture concept are described in
the next chapter.
6.1. Motivation
In large VoIP networks with many inexperienced users that have not received special
training in information security and cannot spend much time on improving the security
of their systems, it is often only a matter of time until someone gets infected by a virus
or attacked by a social engineering attack. In particular, home users switching to VoIP
for their landline connection are likely to simply plug in the box they receive from their
provider. Therefore, the company who runs such a large network should put measures in
place to protect users from infected hosts on the same network and from getting infected
themselves.
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6.2. Concept
The goal of this VoIP security architecture is to make each user more secure even if attacks
and virus infections are happening. The driving concept behind the architecture is collab-
oration, that is servers and clients communicate with each other to increase detection rates
of malicious activities. On the end-user side of communication this collaboration can be
active or passive. An active collaboration involves software that the end-user has to run
close to his VoIP equipment in order to collect additional information about malicious
activities that the service provider cannot see from his position. In a passive collaboration
the user does not have to change his VoIP and network setup or configuration. A small-
scale setup including the key components of the architecture as well as examples of user
reports are shown in figure 6.1.
Personal Firewall data
VoIP anomalies
Malw
are 
activ
ities
Layer 3
Firewall
SBC
VoIP Server
Event Correlation
and Databases
Figure 6.1.: Security architecture inputs: the end-users are shown on the left with their reports
sent back to the service provider on the right
Compared to other general purpose architectures that focus mostly on computer systems
and attack vectors like websites or email attachments, our VoIP security architecture uses
specific characteristics of VoIP traffic such as SIP and RTP packets. Also, the IDS and
event correlation rules have to be specifically tailored to VoIP data and networks to defend
against the specific threats.
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As mentioned at the end of chapter 2, anomaly-free VoIP traffic is relatively easy to pre-
dict. Because of that we can use statistical methods to detect anomalies in network traffic
and anomalous changes in user behaviour. It has been shown that DoS attacks can be
detected by comparing the current network traffic with an estimated baseline [81].
From a single user’s perspective, it is much more likely that someone else on the same
network gets attacked before the worm or automated attack hits that particular user. Even
large-scale attacks launched from many proxies against a large number of users at the
same time (a typical botnet attack) are unlikely to reach all users of a network simul-
taneously. This could be due to different targets (different hardware phone models and
softphones) and differences in end-user defense mechanisms. If one assumes that all users
run the same risk of getting attacked, then the risk for a single user is
P =
nattacks ∗ Pattack
nusers
(6.1)
where nusers can be adapted to reflect only the number of users in a subgroup, for instance
the subset of users using a particular VoIP telephone. Pattack denotes the probability of an
attack on the network and nattacks is the number of attacks within a defined time period.
The concept of a distributed security architecture which provides protection for end-users
by collecting and correlating information across the entire network is similar to cloud-
based (distributed) antivirus solutions. Because more information is available, the ef-
fectiveness of distributed systems is greater. However, a lot of data has to be transfered
between hosts and servers which can decrease performance. On devices that do not have
the processing power of high-end computer systems, in particular mobile devices, the de-
tection functionality of the network service yields better rates compared to local (offline)
analysis [58].
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6.2.1. End-Users
Trust and Security
In chapter 3, rootkits are mentioned as a way to place malicious code in a computing
device such as a personal computer or a VoIP telephone. This means that some of the in-
telligence of the system has to be pulled back towards the core of the network (see chapter
2). While it is true that the firmware or operating system on a residential gateway (RGW)
can be manipulated in the same way, it offers a more controlled device than the mani-
fold of different phone models or even personal computers with their different operating
systems and software versions.
Extending the User’s Devices
A piece of security software can be deployed at the end-user to improve security-related
communication with the service provider. For example, an intrusion detection system
could be installed at the user’s residential gateway to collect accurate information about
malicious packets directed at the user or leaving the user’s broadband connection.
While all of the inputs from the end-user side shown in figure 6.1 can be generated auto-
matically, cases exist where users should be able to report suspicious activities and VoIP
anomalies to the service provider. However, it is crucial that a few users are not able to
alter the VoIP networks behaviour by introducing malicious or wrong data. This can be
achieved by statistical methods such as behaviour change detection and anomaly detec-
tion. The implementation of such methods is beyond the scope of this work.
A reporting option for VoIP users can be as simple as pressing a certain number pad key
or combination of keys to indicate an incoming malicious call they want to be automati-
cally blocked on the provider side in the future. As soon as enough reports from different
users about one particular kind of call are transmitted to the provider, an anomaly detec-
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tion/event correlation engine can be used to decide whether the VoIP network is in need
of protection from this attack.
6.2.2. NAT
In order to provide useful log data, the collaborating RGW has to send information back
to the correlation server that makes it possible to distinguish every individual user. From
a service provider’s point of view, this can be done using the user’s public (facing the
Internet) IP address because all (non-private) IP addresses have to be unique. If two
nodes share the same IP address, routing behaviour is undefined. Therefore, the IDS on
the user’s RGW has to be configured to only listen on the external interface because all
the NAT operations (translating the IP address of the phone on the internal network to the
public address) have been done when a packet leaves the RGW on the external interface.
Also, for packets sent to the user, no NAT has occurred when they enter the RGW on the
external interface.
6.2.3. Detecting VoIP Phone Crashes
Several methods can be applied to detect phones that change from an “up” state (oper-
ational) to “down” (unreachable, not operational). SIP phones have to register with a
PBX before the user is able to send and receive phone calls. This registration has to be
renewed in regular intervals, otherwise the PBX assumes that the phone went offline. By
choosing a short registration interval, a phone that recently crashed can be quickly de-
tected. However, this usually requires the user of a phone to set a very low registration
interval.
Because the security architecture should be deployable without too much coupling to the
end-user’s existing hardware and software, the previously described solution to detect
phone crashes is not suitable. Instead, a separate process running on the user’s gateway
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to his ISP can provide the same information without any changes in the phone’s configu-
ration.
The crash of a particular UA (hardware phone behind a RGW or softphone) can be de-
tected by utilising a heartbeat program that is deployed between the Internet uplink and
the phone. In case of a hardware phone, the heartbeat monitor could be located on the
RGW; in case of a softphone, the monitor might have to run on the same computer if
it is connected directly to the service provider. Nevertheless, a RGW with the required
security software is recommended because it is the least intrusive on the user’s computer
equipment.
(1) OPTIONS request
(2) Response
or timeout
(3) Heartbeat report
(4) Security updates
Figure 6.2.: Heartbeat monitor: (1) sending a request to the phone to check its status; (2) re-
ceiving a reply (phone alive) or experiencing a timeout (phone not responding); (3)
sending report about inactive phone to event correlation server; (4) receiving secu-
rity updates in the form of blacklists or user notifications
Different methods for such a heartbeat “ping” are possible but using SIP OPTION re-
quests via UDP packets is considered the quickest and less intrusive way for this setup.
The reason for this is that almost all SIP-based VoIP devices support this request which
can be sent at any time and does not interrupt ongoing VoIP sessions. The Asterisk PBX
for example sends out an OPTIONS request to each registered phone once a minute (by
default using the Asterisk NOW distribution). As soon as the device does not answer the
request anymore for a given amount of time, the heartbeat monitor assumes that it crashed
or has been switched off.
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Disadvantages
Because the heartbeat monitor cannot distinguish between phone crashes and deliberate
shutdowns, several problems remain that have to solved. Those special scenarios and
possible solutions are listed below.
1. If a phone is unplugged (in case of a hardware phone) or turned off (in case of a
softphone or the computer running the softphone), the heartbeat monitor will report
the new state to the event correlator. This could lead to a flood of “crash” reports
at certain times such as in the evening. A blacklisting approach for such times can
eliminate this problem, however protection provided by the security architecture
is decreased during those excluded times of the day. Also, by combining deregis-
tration information from the PBX with reports from the heartbeat monitor, normal
shutdowns can be detected and filtered.
2. If a phone enters the down state because of the user’s action, the heartbeat monitor
should be notified. This way, it will not report the missing heartbeat response as a
crash. Yet this method is more intrusive since it requires an extension of the hard-
ware phone’s firmware or the softphones software on the computer, respectively.
3. If blacklisting times and feedback from the phone is not possible, too many phone
shutdowns might trigger an alarm in the event correlator. The time windows and
thresholds of the specific event correlation rules can be adapted to the VoIP network
in question, thus avoiding false positives. However, this depends highly on the
specific characteristics of the network and might take a long time to set up properly.
Supported Phones
The following open-souce softphones have been tested with the OPTIONS request “ping”:
Twinkle, KPhone, and Linphone (see table 6.1).
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Phone Response Allow SIP Header
KPhone 200 OK INVITE, OPTIONS, ACK, BYE, MSG, CANCEL,
MESSAGE, SUBSCRIBE, NOTIFY, INFO, REFER
Twinkle 404 Not Found not available
Linphone 200 OK not given in response
Table 6.1.: Results of OPTIONS request against different phones
Note that the 404 Not Found SIP response message is an answer from a VoIP device
that indicates a running SIP server. Therefore, the heartbeat monitor can be sure that the
phone is still running and responding.
6.2.4. User Notification
One effective way to inform users of attacks and vulnerabilities is to use the same com-
munication channel as the threat itself. The reason for that is that no additional form of
communication has to be established which can save costs and makes deployment of VoIP
much easier if a lot of UAs are involved. On the other hand, a DoS or flooding attack will
not only render the VoIP service useless but it will also block the user notification chan-
nel.
Several methods and ways to inform the user of problems and malicious activity over an
existing VoIP architecture are possible:
1. Voice channel, sending information as spoken, pre-recorded announcements
2. Text channel, sending written information on the hardware phones’ display or to
the user interface of a softphone
Option 1 offers seamless integration into every possible VoIP architecture since only the
central VoIP server has to be modified. On the other hand, option 2 might be more user-
friendly and provides a constant flow of information without calling the user.
SIP can be extended with instant messaging capabilities using the MESSAGE method
[82]. It makes sense to use SIP for user notifications because it can be guaranteed that
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all VoIP devices can receive the notifications. However, most phones will not be able
to process these messages and only open-source softphones can be extended to support
instant messaging. Many softphones already include presence and messaging features,
for instance KPhone for Linux (see figure 6.3).
Figure 6.3.: User notification in KPhone
The “Rogue Antivirus” Phenomenon
Faked antivirus programs (fake or rogue AV) with names like “SystemSecurity”, “System-
Guard”, or “Xpantivirus” are a specific type of rougueware and an increasingly dangerous
problem of network security [83]. Malicious hackers write software that looks similar or
even exactly like popular legitimate antivirus programs such as Microsoft Security Es-
sentials. Its intention is to make the victim believe that he is infected with one or several
different viruses. The user is prompted to install the fake AV and pay for the license in
order to clean the computer. However, this actually installs malware on the computer.
This kind of malicious software is called scareware. In consequence, users cannot trust
notifications anymore that recommend to install AV software to protect the computer.
User notifications that are sent from the service provider to the end-user over the Internet
face the same problem of missing credibility. However, in contrast to in-browser pop-
ups, authenticated SIP MESSAGE requests are more trustworthy. Nevertheless, as long
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as packets are not encrypted or signed, man-in-the-middle attacks can always alter the
content of SIP packets. This is due to the fact that authenticated SIP messages merely
carry a challenge response hash in the authentication header line. The rest of the message
is not protected in a cryptographic and secure way.
6.3. Privacy Concerns
Of course any attack countermeasure that holds back information from a user raises pri-
vacy concerns. Also, refusing services such as a connection to the VoIP network could
result in a customer demanding a compensation. Therefore, it is important to get the user’s
approval before an analysis and filtering of any traffic takes place. A motivation for users
is the increased security as shown in chapter 8 and notification of current and new threats
as described earlier in this chapter.
6.4. Scenarios
This section describes exemplary situations where the novel security architecture provides
additional security through the mechanisms specified in the first part of this chapter.
6.4.1. Scenario 1: SIP Scans
SIP scans are used to discover devices on a computer network before an actual attack is
launched. An additional feature is fingerprinting these devices, that is using information
from the scan such as the content of a response packet to determine the version of the
operating system or application that is running on the device.
Most SIP requests can be used to scan a network for VoIP devices. The most common
one is an OPTIONS request because it usually does not cause any reaction on the targeted
phone. The only evidence of such a scan is a log entry which is almost never looked at by
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Layer 3
Firewall
SBC
VoIP Server
Event Correlation
and Databases
OPTIONS scan
Reports scan
Update IP 
blacklist
Figure 6.4.: Scenario 1: Reaction to a SIP OPTIONS scan
the user. An OPTIONS request also sends back more information about the capabilities
of the phone compared to other request types.
The reaction of the components of the security architecture are (see figure 6.4):
1. First end-user’s RGW reports an incoming scan;
2. second end-user’s RGW reports an incoming scan with the same parameters;
3. the event-correlator recognises the organised scan against the network even though
the single end-points only detect one scan instance each;
4. the service provider sends out updates to the end-users so that they can block further
malicious scans or attacks (blacklisting).
6.4.2. Scenario 2: Phone Crash
Most applications connected to a computer network are vulnerable to some kind of remote
exploit attack. One example is KPhone for Linux in versions 4.1 and earlier1. The exploit
works because these versions of KPhone do not verify message length headers against
1http://www.securiteam.com/unixfocus/5PP0B1FCLY.html
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the actual length of the content (a STUN message in this case). This leads to a memory
pointer pointing to a location outside the received message thus crashing the application.
Examples of attacks against hardware phone are given in [37].
Layer 3
Firewall
SBC
VoIP Server
Event Correlation
and Databases
Exploit attack
Report phone 
crash
Update Snort 
signatures
Figure 6.5.: Scenario 2: Reaction to an exploit attack that crashes the phone
If certain conditions hold in the target, sophisticated attacks are able to take control of
the application or the operating system, either as a normal user or as administrator/root
(through a process called privilege escalation). However, most of the time the application
will merely crash. If this happens very often, for instance because it is an ongoing attack
that sends the same malicious packets to the target with high frequency, it can result in a
successful DoS which renders the phone virtually useless.
A heartbeat monitor in the end-user’s private network continuously “pings” the phone
which can be either a hardware phone or a softphone running on a computer. This way, a
crashed phone can be detected. A report is generated by the RGW and sent to the event
correlation engine as shown in figure 6.5. Possible reactions to such an attack include
sending an update for the IDS from the event correlator to all users.
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6.4.3. Scenario 3: User Reports
A VoIP server such as Asterisk can respond to incoming signals. Most of the time, these
are dual-tone multi-frequency signals (DTMF) which are used to dial a number on ana-
logue phones. During a SIP session these DTMF signals can be intercepted, written to a
log file, and analysed by the event correlation engine.
Layer 3
Firewall
SBC
VoIP Server
Event Correlation
and Databases
SPIT call
User reports 
malicious call
Update caller 
blacklist
Figure 6.6.: Scenario 3: Reaction to a SPIT call
This scenario assumes that a set of end-users receive a SPIT call and report it to the service
provider using the phone’s interface. The reporting of the malicious call and the reaction
by the event correlation engine on the service provider’s side of the network are shown in
figure 6.6.
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7. Implementation
This chapter describes the implementation details of the experiments conducted for this
thesis. First, the implementation and setup of the testbed is given. This is used to test
the feasibility of the tools described in the previous chapter. Then, an explanation of
the network simulations using OMNeT++ follows. As [84] points out, “performance
and scalability” are the major advantages of using a network simulation framework for
information security purposes.
7.1. Proof-of-Concept Testbed
The testbed is used to demonstrate the concept of the novel security architecture described
in the previous chapter on a small scale using a realistic network environment. This is
achieved by using one Linux operating system for each end-user (softphone plus security
software). Instead of individual computers for each operating system, virtual machines are
created using VMware Workstation (see chapter 5). After a quick outline of the tasks and
steps involved in setting up the testbed, more detailed explanations of the implementation
are given.
7.1.1. Testbed Security
In order to prevent server and client software, such as VoIP registrars and packet gener-
ators, running on the virtual machines from affecting computers and other devices out-
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side the testbed, a secure and controlled network boundary has to be established. The
testbed’s access to the university’s network and the Internet is controlled by an Internet
gateway running iptables firewall software on a Debian GNU/Linux system. Nodes in
the private network of the testbed can only access the Internet if the gateway is running.
The gateway also has to grant access before individual machines obtain a route to the
Internet. This is done by sending a ping ICMP packet from the gateway to the machine
that wants to access the Internet. Internet access is needed mostly for system maintenance
reasons, for example to install new software which does not come pre-installed with the
distribution.
7.1.2. Collect IDS Data at Residential Gateway
End-users usually have a router deployed at the perimeter of their network. These devices
can execute many different tasks, such as establishing a connection to the service provider,
providing a VoIP adapter to analogue telephones, and wireless access point functionality.
A device that combines those mechanisms is called a residential gateway (RGW). Today’s
RGWs run on modern and fast hardware that enables them to provide many different fea-
tures in parallel. Often, Linux or Unix-based embedded operating systems are installed.
The event collection system is implemented using Linux software which can be deployed
on routers that are capable of running Linux or customised firmware.
The key events that are collected by customer-side RGWs in VoIP networks and that are
correlated at the service provider side are:
1. Simultaneous SIP scans against a certain number of users,
2. known malformed packets (Snort rules), and
3. crashes of UAs or RGWs.
The first two events are realised using the open-source IDS Snort. The rules that are used
to scan the incoming network data can be adapted to new attacks.
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The third event can only be detected with the help of an additional active tool. A Heartbeat
monitor written in C (see appendix D for the relevant source code) scans the VoIP devices
in its network in regular intervals. As soon as a device is not reachable anymore and
the OPTIONS request times out, the heartbeat monitor on the RGW tells the correlation
server of the service provider about the event.
7.1.3. Securely Send Collected Data to Service Provider
An easy way to establish an authorised and encrypted communication channel between
end-users and the centralised correlation and decision engine is the use of the Secure Shell
(SSH) protocol. This secure channel can then be used by the event correlator to retrieve
heartbeat reports and to send out security updates or user notifications.
In a large-scale deployment of the security architecture, transmitting information through
SSH might have to be changed to a different technology because of performance require-
ments (TCP and SSH handshakes involve many packets to initiate a session) and concur-
rency issues (writing information to a file using an SSH remote command). If a more
stable secure communication channel with strong authentication mechanisms such as a
public key infrastructure (PKI) is desirable, a virtual private network (VPN) such as IPsec
or OpenVPN should be used.
7.1.4. User Notification on Different Phones
The SIP MESSAGE request was chosen as the method used to deliver notifications to
the hardware or software phones of the end-users [82]. Unfortunately, since it is not a
feature that is commonly used and since most people do not associate landline telephones
with text messages or instant messaging, support for this SIP request is often incomplete.
Examples of several phones are given in table 7.1. The MESSAGE requests for these tests
were generated with Scapy. The code can be found in appendix B.
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Asterisk is also capable of sending notifications to phones using the SendText command
[85]. This is done by adding a configuration like
exten => 123, 1, Answer
exten => 123, 2, SendText(hello world)
exten => 123, 3, HangUp
which will send a text notification to the phone when the extension number 123 is called.
Phone Support Source
Twinkle does not respond Testbed
KPhone supported Testbed
Linphone supported Testbed
Snom hardware phone limited support Voip-Info.org [85]
Cisco hardware phone supported Voip-Info.org [85]
Table 7.1.: Support for SIP MESSAGE request
7.1.5. Event Correlation Rules
An event correlation engine can take several of the events mentioned in the last section
and put them in a temporal context. If a certain number of events during a predefined time
interval occur, an alarm or a reacting action is triggered as shown in figure 7.1.
Crash of phone BCrash of phone A
Number of 
crashes > x
Notify all users 
with same phone 
model
Malformed packet 
at phone A
Malformed packet 
at phone B
Different packet, 
same malformed 
signature at phone 
C
Number of 
invalid packets 
> x
Add specific 
signature to all 
phones
Figure 7.1.: Two event correlation examples
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The following list gives examples of actions taken after certain events affecting several
end-users have been detected. The variable x denotes the number of end-users on the
network. This can be changed to adjust the algorithms to the specific network.
1. More than x end-users report a malicious traffic event from the same origin: add
origin to blacklist and notify all users.
2. More than x end-user report a crash of their phone’s software: add signature to IDS
of all users.
3. End-user reports connection attempt from blacklisted IP: “upvote” IP on central
blacklist.
4. End-user reports blacklisted malicious data signature: “upvote” signature on central
blacklist.
5. More than x end-users manually report a SIP session (a conversation) as spam or
malicious: add origin or extracted signature to blacklist and notify all users.
See figures 7.2 and 7.3 for diagrams of the event correlation rules. All the rules used in
SEC can be found in text in appendix A.
Snort has to be restarted if its signatures change. This can be done by sending a SIGHUP
signal to the snort process on the RGW.
7.1.6. Phone Crashes and Phones Unregistering
The event correlation engine can distinguish between an UA unregistering from the PBX
(Asterisk) and an UA crashing due to a software bug or exploit attack. Usually, the heart-
beat monitor running on the RGW will report any missing response to the SIP OPTIONS
request (see table 6.1). Due to the simple implementation of the heartbeat monitor in the
testbed (see appendix C for the relevant code sections), it cannot determine the reason
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DEREGISTER 
message for 
specific phone
Ignore events from 
same phone for 60 
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Incoming crash 
report from 
heartbeat monitor 
for specific phone 
a.b.c.d
Create event 
“PHONE_a.b.c.d_
DOWN”
Create context for 
“PHONE_a.b.c.d_
DOWN” to ignore 
further events
First 
“PHONE_a.b.c.d_
DOWN” event?
True
Create event 
“PHONE_DOWN” 
(any phone)
True
More than x phones 
down in y seconds?
Series of related 
phone crashes 
detected
True
Warn users using 
the same phone 
model via 
MESSAGE 
request
Figure 7.2.: Event correlation in SEC: crash detection
why the phone is not responding. However, the combination of Snort and heartbeat mon-
itor on the RGW, and the event correlator SEC makes it possible to ignore phones not
responding if they unregistered from the PBX.
An excerpt of the Snort log of one RGW as sent to the correlation server is given below.
SEC can use this information to ignore incoming heartbeat timeout reports because the
event correlation engine knows that the UA exited normally and did not crash suddenly.
This is done with a simple correlation rule that ignores incoming heartbeat reports from
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Snort on phone 
[from]
Create event 
“[type]_SCAN_ON_[from]_FROM_[to]”
Create context for 
“[type]_SCAN_ON
_[to]” to ignore 
further events
First scan event for 
phone [from]?
True
Create event 
“SIP_SCAN” (any 
phone)
True
More than x 
phones scanned 
in y seconds?
Series of related 
SIP scans 
detected
True
Update blacklist 
and send back to 
phones
Figure 7.3.: Event correlation in SEC: scan detection
the RGW as long as the phone is not registered at the PBX. The phone is identified by its
public IP address.
Nov 1 00:20:36 192.168.50.11
snort: [1:2:0] DEREGISTER {UDP}
192.168.50.11:5060 -> 192.168.50.5:5060
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7.2. Network Simulation
In order to obtain data about the performance of the security architecture on a larger scale
than is possible within the testbed, network simulations using OMNeT++ (introduced in
chapter 5) are conducted. A simulation framework also allows for quick development of
new features without having to patch a real-world application or even operating system or
firmware. Additional features can only be provided if the source code is available (open
source) or if the software uses a plugin or module architecture. Additionally, it is easy to
collect data from sensors across the network and inside individual modules, and aggregate
them in a central data file.
Figure 7.4 shows a screenshot of a small VoIP network and a detailed view of a home
user’s network with RGW and UA.
Figure 7.4.: Small simulation (overview on the left, detailed view of a home user’s network on
the right)
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7.2.1. Limitations and Assumptions
Simulations can only produce satisfying results if the underlying model is accurate and
as realistic as possible for the scenario to be analysed. However, it is not feasible to im-
plement details such as different media (copper cable, fibre optic, wireless) or even their
underlying physical properties when modeling Internet connections. Therefore, realistic
assumptions are made. These assumptions can be based on previous experiments (empir-
ical) or on calculations (theoretical).
The assumptions for the network simulation model of the security architecture are as
follows:
Internet Connection Speed and Bandwidth
INET for OMNeT++ provides very accurate implementations of many network protocols
such as Ethernet, IP, TCP, and UDP. However, processing times on devices and propa-
gation delays for transmissions across are network are not simulated automatically. For
the purpose of evaluating the performance of the security architecture, common round-
trip times (RTT) that are encountered by Internet users are used. For private (no high-
performance business or university) Internet lines, RTTs are usually between 10ms and
40ms for national connections as shown in table 7.2.
Target minimum maximum average
www.canterbury.ac.nz 11.25ms 30.72ms 14.42ms
www.auckland.ac.nz 23.95ms 42.15ms 30.38ms
www.google.co.nz 23.74ms 37.26ms 27.82ms
www.kit.edu (Germany) 312.86ms 337.27ms 318.92ms
github.com (USA) 245.72ms 257.87ms 250.11ms
Table 7.2.: Round-trip times for different servers from private ADSL in New Zealand (10 pings
with a packet size of 64 bytes per target)
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Processing Speed of RGWs and Event Correlator
As mentioned above, processing times of devices or protocol stacks are not automatically
implemented in OMNeT++ and INET. However, processing delays can be realised using
timers that send internal messages to notify the OMNeT++ module that a process has
finished.
VoIP and Non-VoIP Attacks and Vulnerabilities
In order to implement realistic attack scenarios, the simulation model has to contain many
software parts and processes, for instance all the execution paths inside the vulnerable
software. This is not feasible for an architecture that does not focus on one specific
application or exploit. Therefore, a special attack packet is used that simply indicates the
kind of attack. The RGWs and UAs react accordingly when they receive such a packet.
7.2.2. Implementation Steps in OMNeT++
The following paragraphs describe the steps necessary to develop a functional network
simulation model using OMNeT++ and INET.
Module Descriptions
Before the VoIP network can be assembled for the simulation model, its parts have to
be defined and implemented. Some of these parts come with OMNeT++ and INET, for
instance an ethernet switch and a network host running TCP and UDP applications. Most
modules have to be developed specifically for the simulation of the security architecture.
In OMNeT++, modules that do not contain other modules are called simple modules.
Modules that contain other modules are called compound modules. All modules that are
defined specifically for the simulation of the security architecture are listed below.
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1. UA UDP application: simple module embedded in INET’s standard host
2. SEC UDP application: simple module embedded in INET’s standard host
3. Application firewall module with routing functionlity to inspect traffic on all net-
work layers, derived from INET’s standard host
4. RGW UDP application: simple module embedded in application firewall compound
module
While modules 1 and 2 only have to implement the behaviour of the according UDP
application, module 4 is embedded in a new module (module 3). This application firewall
and router module is not supplied by INET. It is needed for forwarding ARP requests and
IP packets like an INET router module while still being able to run UDP applications such
as the RGW UDP application that handles incoming SIP traffic.
Network Description
After all parts of the network are defined (either by OMNeT++, INET, or in new modules),
the VoIP simulation network is assembled. The network features an arbitrary number
of end-users, each one consisting of an RGW and a UA. All network traffic (incoming
and outgoing) for an end-user’s UA has to pass through the RGW. The two devices are
connected via a 100Mbps Ethernet LAN, a setup found in most private and business local
networks.
All end-users are interconnected via a central router. The connection between the users
and the central router is a line with a random delay within the boundaries of real-world
Internet traffic delay mentioned above. To avoid ARP requests for what is a very basic
routing setup, the Point-to-point protocol (PPP) is used. This resembles production DSL
connections which are usually connected via PPP or a variation thereof such as PPPoE
(chapter 3.6.2 [36]). The event correlation engine (simple event correlator, SEC) is also
connected locally to that switch. Therefore, the switch can be seen as the simplified
network infrastructure of the service provider running the VoIP service.
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Modules and networks can be defined either by using a graphical user interface or by
writing the specification in the special-purpose scripting language NED. All module and
network specifications are compiled into the executable simulation binary.
Custom Message Specification
OMNeT++ provides a simple mechanism to develop new message formats without forc-
ing the developer to write all its functionality in C++. The definition of a SIP packet in
the simulation does not include all the mandatory headers specified in the RFC [82] but
concentrates on information that is essential to simulate VoIP attacks and their mitigation
techniques. The definition of the SIP message type is given in table 7.3. Table 7.4 shows
the fields of the attack message type used to send abstract attack descriptions from the
attacking UA to the victim UAs. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 show the structure of the supporting
attack report and security update message types.
Field name Type Description
msg String Request method or response code
from String SIP “From” header
to String SIP “To” header
via String One SIP “Via” header
callId String SIP “Call-ID” header
seqNo Integer Sequence number part of SIP “CSeq” header
seqMethod String Request method part of SIP “CSeq” header
contentLength Integer SIP “Content-Length” header
body String Embedded SIP body, for example an SDP message
Table 7.3.: SIP message definition for the network simulation
Field name Type Description
type Integer 0 = no attack, 1 = OPTIONS scan, 2 = exploit attack
payload String Attack-specific payload, for example exploited vulnerability
Table 7.4.: Attack message definition for the network simulation
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Field name Type Description
type Integer 0 = IDS, 1 = heartbeat
userId Integer End-user identifier
payload String Report payload, for example phone’s program version
Table 7.5.: Report message definition for the network simulation
Field name Type Description
type Integer 0 = IP blacklist, 1 = signature update
payload String Update payload, for example IP address or signature
Table 7.6.: Update message definition for the network simulation
Behaviour Implementation
When all networks, modules, and message types are specified, the behaviour of the new
modules has to be implemented. In the OMNeT++ framework, this is done using the
programming language C++. A C++ file has to be provided for each newly developed
simple module. Compound modules are not programmed in C++, they merely consist of
input and output gates, parameters, and simple modules. A UML class diagram of these
C++ classes is shown in figure 7.5.
The classes in the first two layers from the top are supplied by OMNeT++ and INET, re-
spectively. VoipModule is used to generalise common functionality of UAs and RGWs
UDP application classes. One example for such a function is displaying a notification
message next to the affected end-user’s network in the simulation GUI.
IpWithBlacklist replaces INET’s default IP module in order to add blacklisting
functionality. The extended IP module is used in the RGWs which receive updates for
their blacklists from the SEC.
Now, the network simulation can be visually executed at different speeds using the OM-
NeT++ GUI. Notification areas (bubbles) above affected networks or devices indicate
important events as shown in figure 7.6. Additional messages and all events of a sim-
ulation run are also written to log files. If performance is more important than visual
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feedback, simulations can also be run using the command line which requires less pro-
cessing power.
UDPAppBase (INET)
UA RGW
SEC
IP (INET)
IpWithBlacklist
blacklist : vector
VoipModule
timer : Timer
cSimpleModule
Figure 7.5.: UML class diagram of simulation modules
Scenario Configuration
In order to maintain flexibility while running different simulated scenarios, OMNeT++
utilises an INI file that contains key/value pairs. Each module (simple or compound)
has a set of defined parameters that can be set either in the NED file of the module (see
Module Descriptions) or in the simulation configuration file (INI file). When a simulation
is started, one or a set of scenarios with different parameter settings can be selected. The
values of the parameters can be retrieved inside the C++ source code of a module by using
the OMNeT++ API.
In order to create a functioning simulation with INET, the configuration file has to be used
to assign UDP application modules to the host modules. In the simulations conducted for
this thesis, there was only one UDP application per host running on port 5060 (SIP).
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Figure 7.6.: Sequence of screenshots of a simulated OPTIONS scan attack
81
82
8. Evaluation
The previous chapters described the novel security architecture. In this chapter, the results
from testing the system for security enhancements and performance are presented. First,
an overview of the evaluation process is given. Then, VoIP honeypot results, qualitative
results from the proof-of-concept testbed, and quantitative results from the network simu-
lation are analysed. Known and yet to solve problems encountered during the experiments
are described at the end of this chapter.
8.1. Evaluation Process and Input Data
In order to determine the usefulness and effectiveness of the implementation of the new
architecture, measurements of the security improvements have to be taken. The qualitative
and quantitative methods used in the evaluation part of this thesis are described in the
following sections.
Two different types of input data can be used for the security and performance experi-
ments: constructed data and network traffic from the real world. The former can be traffic
specifically generated to exploit a known vulnerability, or it can be randomised using
fuzzing techniques. VoIP-specific network traffic from the real world has been captured
and analysed using a honeypot as described in chapter 5. Based on the results from the
honeypot and from other reports on malicious VoIP traffic, specific attacks (OPTIONS re-
quest scanning) were generated for the testbed. The network simulation utilised abstract
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attack messages that do not resemble real attack data. The behaviour of these messages
were based on observations of the honeypot and the testbed.
8.2. Honeypot Results
The VoIP module for the honeypot Dionaea collected data over the period of 48 days.
During that time, 70 SIP connections to port 5060 of the honeypot server were made from
the outside. Figure 8.1 shows the distribution of connections per day for the period of
observation (from 1/11/2010 to 18/12/2010). The number of connections per day ranges
from 0 to 5. The average number of connections per day, or mean, is µ = 70
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≈ 1.46, the
median is 1. This can also be seen in figure 8.2 which shows that the most common case
is one connection per day. Also, there is a clear clustering around the mean whereas high
values are very rare. The standard deviation for the number of connections per day is
σ =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi − µ)2 ≈ 1.93 (8.1)
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Figure 8.1.: Number of hosts connecting to VoIP honeypot on port 5060 between 01/11/2010
and 18/12/2010
The distribution of originating countries of the remote hosts is shown in table 8.1. It does
not come as a surprise that connections from China make up for more than half the scans.
USA follows with a large distance and the other countries only contributed one or two
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Figure 8.2.: Frequency of connections per day to VoIP honeypot
connections each. With exception of the continent of South America, the connections
originated from all over the world.
Country Connections Percentage
China 41 58.6%
USA 10 14.3%
Japan 2 2.8%
Korea 2 2.8%
Nigeria 2 2.8%
Russia 2 2.8%
Australia 1 1.4%
Brazil 1 1.4%
Germany 1 1.4%
Spain 1 1.4%
Hong Kong 1 1.4%
Italy 1 1.4%
Netherlands 1 1.4%
Romania 1 1.4%
Thailand 1 1.4%
Taiwan 1 1.4%
South Africa 1 1.4%
Table 8.1.: Honeypot connections by country (percentages rounded)
An example of one malicious incoming SIP request from the scanning tool sundayddr and
one response from the honeypot is given at the end of this chapter.
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8.2.1. Similarities
There are strong similarities between most of the connections made by scanning tools
to the SIP honeypot. All of these used a long random integer for the Call-ID. However,
all connections made by the sundayddr tool contained a Call-ID starting with 003484.
The Call-IDs of the other tool resembled a more random pattern. Also, all incoming
OPTIONS requests used the extension number 100 for the From and To parameters of the
SIP header.
The different characteristics of scanning hosts connecting to the VoIP honeypot are shown
in table 8.2. The groups are based on common characteristics found in several scan con-
nections. Many connections share the same values across all header fields.
User agent Via From
Asterisk PBX 127.0.0.1 “sipvicious” <sip:100@1.1.1.1>
sipvicious real address or 127.0.0.1 “sipvicious” <sip:100@1.1.1.1>
sundayddr 192.168.1.9 “sipsscuser” <sip:100@192.168.1.9>
Table 8.2.: Notable characteristics of connecting SIP clients sending OPTIONS requests
Only one SIP request from SIPVicious used a different Contact header:
sip:None@127.0.1.1:5060.
8.2.2. SIP Calls
Two incoming SIP connections tried to establish a SIP call by sending an INVITE request.
These two connection attempts occurred on November 30 and December 8. That is about
2.8% of all total connections to the SIP service. The order of the SIP header lines were
the same as with SIPVicious and sipssc. However, different extensions were used for
the To and From headers. Both INVITE requests were sent to the extension number
0014089078000. This number does not appear to be random because seven out of
13 digits are zeros. It looks like a telephone number with a country code 0014 or +14
which is the prefix for numbers in Brazil. The extension number used for the sender of
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the request is 9309565. According to GeoIP [86], those two call attempts originated
from Amsterdam in the Netherlands and San Francisco, USA.
However, a response for the INVITE requests was not sent because of a software bug in
the honeypot module. The moment the incoming INVITE request is processed by the SIP
parsing function, the following log entry is generated:
warning: Mandatory header content-type not in message
This due to the fact that a phone call has to specify the details of the session, which is
usually done by embedding an SDP message in the SIP body. Because of the missing
SDP message, no research on brute-force attacks against the authentication mechanism
used for INVITE requests could be conducted. Also, no RTP channel was established
that could have provided useful information on the type of the phone call.
8.2.3. Conclusion
In conclusion, most connections came from either the original or a modified version of
SIPVicious. As shown in chapter 4, the signatures of the SIP messages are very similar to
those of the VoIP tool suite SIPVicious.
8.3. Security Improvements of the Security
Architecture
Many existing programs and security mechanisms have proven that they are suitable for
improving network security in VoIP environments. In particular, open-source software is
very flexible when it comes to supporting new protocols or implementing new communi-
cation paths between several different programs. One example of this is the collaboration
of the IDS Snort and the event correlator SEC. The combination of the simulated IDS
reacting to incoming special attack packets, and the simple event correlator (SEC) as a
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dedicated server within the network simulation provides enhanced security for the vir-
tual VoIP network. The scenarios that have been used to test the capabilities of the novel
security architecture are as follows.
8.3.1. Detection and Mitigation of SIP Scanning Attacks
Snort is able to detect all known attacks as soon as signatures are available. Therefore,
for a single user Snort in combination with an adaptive firewall can provide a significant
improvement in security. This is valid as long as the user does not fall victim to a zero-day
exploit. Statistically it is more likely that one of the many other users gets attacked first.
As soon as the victim of the attack triggers the distribution of new Snort signature files,
all the other users on the network will be safe from this particular attack.
SEC has proven to be a solution that is easy to deploy in small networks. However, large
enterprise networks often demand additional features such as load-balancing. SEC does
not provide these features out-of-the-box but it is feasible to adapt it to the requirements
of the specific environment.
An improvement in end-user security can be achieved by notifying them of current threats.
Often, users forget about persistent threats or are not aware of new techniques used by
criminals and malicious hackers.
Figure 8.3 shows a section of the simulation event log during one successful OPTIONS
scan. Most of the layers of the TCP/IP networking stack involved are hidden to simplify
the display of the message flow through the network. The attacking user (user 3) is only
shown from an outside perspective, that is as seen by the service provider. The receiver of
the OPTIONS scan is shown in more detail, that is UA and RGW are shown as separate
axes. Because UA and RGW communicate via Ethernet, an ARP request and response
dialog can be seen in the centre of the screenshot.
Figure 8.4 shows a section of the simulation event log from the last OPTIONS scan re-
port to the update of the blacklist of malicious IP addresses of all the users’ RGWs. The
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Figure 8.3.: Section of simulation event log showing one OPTIONS scan from user 3 to user 8.
X axis shows time in nonlinear format.
lowest abstraction level displayed is the main network topology, which means that only
the external interfaces of the end-user networks and the SEC are visible. All the network-
ing layers involved in transmitting the attack and the resulting IDS report such as IP and
UDP are hidden. After the threshold for OPTIONS scan reports has been exceeded by the
IDS report from user 6, the SEC generates an update packet with the new malicious IP to
blacklist for each end-user and sends it to their respective RGW. The figure also shows
how user 3 and user 6 receive the blacklist update packets sent to their RGWs.
The number of OPTIONS scans sent by the attacker and detected by the end-users’ RGWs
are shown in figure 8.5. Each attack generated by the attacking user results in a delayed
detection by the victim’s RGW using an intrusion detection system and VoIP-specific
signatures. This RGW then sends a report about the ongoing attack to the SEC. After six
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Figure 8.4.: Section of simulation event log showing blacklist update from SEC to all users. User
6 sent last OPTIONS scan report that exceeded the threshold of the event correlator.
X axis shows time in nonlinear format.
reported scan attacks, the SEC updates the blacklist of all users. The attacker ignores the
blacklisted IP address of its phone so that he can continue sending malicious OPTIONS
scans. All other RGWs drop packets from the blacklisted IP address. Therefore, the flow
of scan reports stop after six reports.
Figure 8.6 shows the same scenario with four attackers. Each attacker starts sending OP-
TIONS requests at a random time in the interval [0.5s, 2s] with uniform probability dis-
tribution. The delay between each scan attack is a random time interval out of [0.3s, 0.8s]
with uniform probability distribution. The graph shows the sum of OPTIONS requests
sent by the attackers, the sum of detected scans by the end-users’ RGWs, and the number
of scan reports at the SEC over time.
Figure 8.7 shows a larger and more realistic VoIP network scenario with 100 users. Now,
the SEC resets the counter for the scan reports after the threshold has been reached. This
is needed to be able to block more than only one IP address from a malicious user who
is sending OPTIONS requests to the rest of the network. This leads to a sawtooth plot,
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Figure 8.5.: Scan attacks over time, one attacker, showing the number of packets sent by the
attacker, total scans received by the affected users, and scan reports at SEC
and to more and more attackers being blacklisted on the RGWs of the regular users.
The derivative of the scan reports curve decreases over time. This means that the curve
showing the number of scan reports grows slower over time. This shows that the event
correlator and the IP blacklists on the RGWs provide an effective countermeasure against
SIP scan attacks.
8.3.2. Detection and Mitigation of Exploit Attacks
After malicious OPTIONS requests, exploit attacks against vulnerabilities in the software
of specific phones were examined. The scenario of exploit attacks against vulnerabilities
in the VoIP phones of multiple users yields similar results and patterns compared to the
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Figure 8.6.: Scan attacks over time, multiple attackers, showing the number of packets sent by
attackers, total scans received by the affected users, and scan reports at SEC
previous configuration with SIP scans. However, the mechanisms that mitigate the at-
tacks work in a different way. The heartbeat monitor that checks the health of the phone
from the RGW proved to successfully detect sudden phone software crashes. The testbed
showed that it can also distinguish between phones unregistering from the PBX and actual
crashes.
Figure 8.8 shows the packets sent by the four attacking users, the sum of successful exploit
attacks at the victims’ phones, and the sum of signature matches after the SEC received
crash reports from multiple RGWs.
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Figure 8.7.: Scan attacks over time, multiple attackers, large network
8.3.3. Discussion of RGW and SEC Parameters
Several simulation runs with the same scenario and pseudo-random numbers were used
to test the influence of different settings of core parameters of the security architecture.
These parameters are the delay between SIP OPTIONS requests for the heartbeat monitor
and the threshold for phone crash reports in the RGWs and SEC, respectively. The values
used for these parameters along with the time of the first successful exploit signature
match of the IDS in the RGW after signature updates have been sent out by the SEC
are given in table 8.3 and figure 8.9. The conclusion from these experiments is that the
heartbeat interval is far more important to the reaction time of the architecture than the
threshold. This is due to the fact that at a fast rate of attacks the threshold is exceeded
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Figure 8.8.: Exploit attacks and signature hits over time, multiple attackers
very quickly but reports are only sent out after a ping of the heartbeat monitor times out,
that is no response comes back from the phone.
Heartbeat interval (RGW) Reports threshold (SEC) Time of first signature match (RGW)
10 5 21.69s
10 10 21.69s
10 50 37.22s
30 5 37.22s
30 10 37.22s
30 50 37.22s
60 5 71.47s
60 10 71.47s
60 50 71.47s
Table 8.3.: Parameters used for heartbeat interval and phone crash reports threshold and time of
first successfully matched exploit signature
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8.4. Performance
A simulation framework like OMNeT++ can be used to obtain indicative and conclusive
performance data of an implementation of the security architecture. This work describes
the results of a proof-of-concept implementation. These results indicate that the security
architecture provides its services to the end-users with good performance and little over-
head. Further improvements in performance can be made using multicast functionality
of IPv6 when sending the same content to many different users. Since the VoIP network
is already capable of delivering a high number of packets with real-time requirements,
the additional packets for reports, updates, and user notifications are not likely to con-
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gest the network. However, in order to determine the limits of the architecture in case of
a widespread DoS attack, a thorough analysis and more experiments of such a scenario
have to be conducted. This should also include more realistic simulation modules that
emulate software from the real-world.
8.5. Known Problems
Limited Range of Supported Phones
Only a limited number of phone models have been tested within the security architecture.
This is acceptable since this thesis describes and implements the concept of a novel secu-
rity architecture for VoIP networks. Also, the network simulation used abstraction layers
to be independent from specific attacks or software vulnerabilities by using an attack
packet that triggers a certain reaction inside the UAs and RGWs.
Software Only Tested in Lab Environment
Some of the software, preexisting SIP servers and clients as well as newly written soft-
ware like the heartbeat monitor, provide useful and fully functional features to the section
architecture. However, their current implementations can fail or crash in real-life, large-
scale networks. One example is the heartbeat monitor that does not respond for a given
timeout period if a port is not reachable. In this case, it does not produce an error message
that the event correlator could process.
Limited Emulation of Software in Simulation
In order to simplify the simulation of existing software like Snort, SEC, and iptables
(Linux firewall), abstraction layers such as attack packets and generic report packets were
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used instead of specific malicious SIP packets or realistic Snort log messages, respec-
tively. However, in a real-world scenario, the transmission and processing of this infor-
mation can have strong implications on reaction time and the security of the network.
Limited Functionality of Honeypot Module
The honeypot module was able to parse and respond to simple OPTIONS request which
are commonly used in scanning attacks. More sophisticated requests like an INVITE
message can be parsed if they are correct according to the SIP specification. However,
honeypot has to be able to react to uncommon and malicious packets. Therefore, a more
resilient and realistic honeypot or an improved version of the dionaea honeypot module
should be used in further research.
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8.6. SIP Request and Response Example
stream = [
(’in’, b’OPTIONS sip:100@132.181.19.2 SIP/2.0\r\n
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.9:5060;
branch=z9hG4bK-50189216;rport\r\n
Content-Length: 0\r\n
From: "sipsscuser"<sip:100@192.168.1.9>;
tag=71549043630862915906794138894448007632323469000\r\n
Accept: application/sdp\r\n
User-Agent: sundayddr\r\n
To: "sipssc"<sip:100@192.168.1.9>\r\n
Contact: sip:100@192.168.1.9:5060\r\n
CSeq: 1 OPTIONS\r\n
Call-ID: 129635798199182432847141937\r\n
Max-Forwards: 70\r\n\r\n’),
(’out’, b’SIP/2.0 200 OK\n
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP localhost:5060\n
To: "sipsscuser"<sip:100@192.168.1.9>;
tag=71549043630862915906794138894448007632323469000\n
From: 100 <sip:100@localhost>\n
Call-ID: 129635798199182432847141937\n
CSeq: 1 OPTIONS\n
Contact: 100 <sip:100@132.181.19.2>\n
Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE\n
Accept: application/sdp\nAccept-Language: en\n\n’)
]
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9. Conclusion
9.1. Summary
This thesis described the situation of threats and vulnerabilities in SIP-based VoIP envi-
ronments. Existing solutions and ongoing research in the area of VoIP network security
and threat mitigation were described and analysed for their effectiveness in a scenario
where compromised or malicious users are expected.
The results from the proof-of-concept testbed indicate that a security architecture for large
VoIP networks can be implemented using only Unix-based systems and free open-source
tools. The goal of network security happening in the background without overwhelming
either users or administrators with log entries and security-related warning messages was
achieved. Beyond the implementation done for this work, areas of potential additions to
the architecture, and therefore further improvement of security, were identified. These
areas are described in the following section about future work.
The results from the network simulation are indicative but not conclusive for large and
complex VoIP networks like they exist in the real world. This is due to the fact that many
components of the simulation model were approximated instead of fully emulated. Exper-
iments were conducted to acquire realistic parameters for these components, for example
round trip times of data packets on the Internet and the way specific VoIP phones respond
to given input. However, not all components could be fitted with realistic settings.
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This work showed the effectiveness of virtualisation technology and network simulations
for implementing and evaluating small-scale networks and large-scale network models.
Simulations were used to automate scenarios and acquire sensor data from many different
nodes of the modelled network. Since experiments have to be repeatable and yield useful
– that is not random – results, automation was an important factor in designing the testbed
and even more in implementing the network simulations.
The VoIP module for the honeypot software Dionaea was developed in cooperation with
members from the Honeynet Project. During the data collection phase, it worked flaw-
lessly for scan attacks using OPTIONS requests. A significant amount of data was gath-
ered, in particular when considering that it ran only on one small subnet that was not
advertised. The collected data shows heavy use of mostly related variations of SIP scan-
ning tools that try to discover vulnerable versions of phone models and VoIP servers.
However, no SIP or RTP-based exploits or attacks were discovered. Two promising at-
tempts to establish a call by sending an INVITE request could not be put to further use
because of missing responses sent back from the honeypot. Therefore, a dialog with the
attacker could not be established, which led to loss of potentially important data that goes
beyond common SIP scans.
9.2. Future Work
9.2.1. Performance
Because the testbed of the architecture was a proof-of-concept implementation using tools
that enabled the thesis’ author to demonstrate the use of existing open-source software,
performance was not always considered the highest priority. If custom-built software is
used instead of many separate tools, and if interpreted programs and scripts are replaced
by faster running binary executables, a performance gain on a large network is likely. This
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needs further research beyond the proof-of-concept and early indications provided in this
thesis.
9.2.2. Realistic VoIP Data
To capture real-world malicious VoIP network data, a honeypot for SIP was written and
deployed on the university network and exposed to the Internet. Because the honeypot was
confined to one public subnet, its results are not extensive enough to be representative of
the whole Internet. However, comparisons and data exchange with other parties who ran
the same honeypot setup confirmed the attacks on the honeypot used for this thesis. The
area of VoIP honeypots, their deployment, and how to advertise them on the Internet is an
important part of future research on a VoIP-specific security architecture.
9.2.3. SIP and RTP Attacks Beyond Primitive Scans
The honeypot used in this work could detect and log scanning attacks consisting of OP-
TIONS requests. However, actual SIP calls (INVITE requests) and RTP data could not be
analysed. This was due to the fact that the incoming INVITE requests did not contain an
SDP message embedded in the SIP body. Improvements on the honeypot and the environ-
ment in which it is deployed have to be done to get more useful data on dangerous threats.
Targeted advertisement of the honeypot’s address on the Internet could also increase the
rate of incoming messages and therefore improve the results.
9.2.4. Extensions and Generalisation
This thesis’ scope was confined to research, analyse, and improve security of a large VoIP
network. The main protocols of this thesis, SIP and RTP, can be used in many other appli-
cations such as video conferencing, instant messaging, and gaming. With further research
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and more experiments, the security architecture can be extended to those applications and
even to a general security architecture for all network traffic.
The testbed and network simulation can also be extended to provide a more accurate
model of the real world. In particular, the network simulation in this thesis generated
messages to trigger certain functionality in the emulated security tools. In a more sophis-
ticated model, an IDS module within OMNeT++ could analyse incoming network traffic
and emulate Snort’s behaviour.
9.2.5. Incorporating Asterisk
While the open-source Linux distribution “Asterisk NOW” was used to provide a VoIP
PBX to the softphones used in the testbed, Asterisk itself was not specifically configured
or modified to support the security architecture. Asterisk runs with a very flexible config-
uration that allows VoIP users to initiate actions specified within Asterisk. One example
is the implementation of a user reporting function using DTMF, that is dialing numbers
during an active phone call session. Furthermore, extensions on the Asterisk server could
provide additional security without (additional) modifications on the end-user’s side of
the connection.
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A. SEC Rules
A.1. Scan Attack Correlation
# Collecting information on certain events (normalisation)
# SIP scan (any type)
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=^.+\].+\] SIP (\S+) scan
\[\*\*\].+(\d+\/\d+)-(\S+)\s+(\S+)\s+->\s+(\S+)
desc=SIP $1 SCAN FROM $4
action=event $1_SCAN_ON_$2_FROM_$3: $0; add SCAN_REPORT %t: %s
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(\S+)_SCAN_ON_(\S+)_FROM_(\S+):
context=!CONTEXT_$1_SCAN_ON_$2
desc=New $1 scan on $2
action=create CONTEXT_$1_SCAN_ON_$2 60; event SIP_SCAN_FROM_$3
# Flooding: more than x SIP scans in given window
type=SingleWithThreshold
window=3
thresh=6
context=!FLOODING
ptype=RegExp
pattern=SIP_SCAN_FROM_(\S+)
desc=Threshold of scans from $1 exceeded
action=create FLOODING 3;
write sec.log %t SIP scans attack detected
# Flooding on different hosts:
# more than x hosts scanned in given window
type=SingleWithThreshold
window=3
thresh=3
context=!FLOODING
ptype=RegExp
pattern=SIP_SCAN_FROM_(\S+)
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desc=Threshold of scans from $1 on different hosts exceeded
action=create FLOODING 3;
write sec.log %t SIP scans attack detected
A.2. Crash Correlation
# Ignore phone crashes (shutdowns) when phone DEREGISTERs
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=DEREGISTER {\S+} (\S+) -> (\S+)
desc=PHONE $2 deregistered
action=create IGNORE_PHONE_$2 60
# Crash report (any host)
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=^(\d+-\d+-\d+) (\d+:\d+:\d+) (\S+) is down
desc=PHONE $3 DOWN
action=event PHONE_$3_DOWN: $0; add CRASH_REPORT %t: %s
# Crash on any host: ignore same host in the future
type=Single
pytype=RegExp
pattern=PHONE_(\S+)_DOWN:
context=!CRASH_FROM_$1_CONTEXT
desc=Phone $1 crashed
action=create CRASH_FROM_$1_CONTEXT 60; event PHONE_DOWN: $0
# Phone crash reports from different hosts
type=SingleWithThreshold
window=60
thresh=2
ptype=RegExp
pattern=PHONES_DOWN:
context=!IGNORE_PHONE_CRASHES_CONTEXT
desc=Phone crash report threshold exceeded
action=write sec.log %t: %s;
shellcmd ssh heartbeat@localhost echo UPDATE >> /tmp/update_report
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B. Proof-of-concept SIP
Notification Scapy Script
(Python)
def createMessage(dst, msg):
s = "MESSAGE sip:1100@" + dst + " SIP/2.0\n"
s += "Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.50.100:5060\n"
s += "From: \"server\" <sip:server@192.168.50.100:5060>\n"
s += "To: \"alice\" <sip:1100@" + dst + ">\n"
s += "Call-ID: 12345\n"
s += "CSeq: 1 MESSAGE\n"
s += "Content-Type: text/plain\n"
s += "Content-Length: %i\n\n" % len(msg)
s += msg
return IP(dst=dst)/UDP(dport=5060, sport=5060)/s
send(createMessage("192.168.50.11", "User notification!"))
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C. Simulation Code (C++)
The following code sections are the relevant parts to the core functionality of the network simula-
tion. Initialisation, shut down, and similar sections of code are not shown.
C.1. User Agent Module
void UA::handleMessage(cMessage *msg)
{
if (msg->isSelfMessage())
{
// The message sent to the module by itself should be the attack timer
if (msg == &m_timer)
{
if (par("attackType").longValue() == 1)
{
// Record the number of scan packets sent for later analysis
m_vectorAttackerScans.record(++m_numAttackerScanMessages);
// Send a repeating scan attack to random users
IPvXAddress victimAddress;
AttackPacket* pk = this->generateScanAttackPacket(&victimAddress);
m_statsVictims.collect(victimAddress.get4().getDByte(3));
// Send to victim
this->sendToUDP(pk, m_port, victimAddress, 5060);
// Schedule next attack
this->scheduleAt(simTime() + par("scanAttackDelay"), &m_timer);
}
else if (par("attackType").longValue() == 2)
{
// Record the number of exploit packets sent for later analysis
m_vectorAttackerExploits.record(++m_numAttackerExploits);
// Send an exploit attack to a random user
IPvXAddress victimAddress;
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AttackPacket* pk = this->generateExploitAttackPacket(&victimAddress);
m_statsVictims.collect(victimAddress.get4().getDByte(3));
// Send to victim
this->sendToUDP(pk, m_port, victimAddress, 5060);
// Schedule next attack
this->scheduleAt(simTime() + par("exploitAttackDelay"), &m_timer);
}
}
}
else
{
// Do not react to incoming messages if phone crashed due to
// exploit attack
if (!m_phoneDown) this->handleIncomingMessage(msg);
delete msg;
}
}
void UA::handleIncomingMessage(cMessage *msg)
{
SipPacket *sip = dynamic_cast<SipPacket*>(msg);
AttackPacket *attack = dynamic_cast<AttackPacket*>(msg);
if (sip != NULL)
{
// User notification
if (strcmp(sip->getMsg(), "MESSAGE") == 0)
{
this->bubbleNw("User notification MESSAGE");
}
// OPTIONS ping from RGW
else if (strcmp(sip->getMsg(), "OPTIONS") == 0)
{
SipPacket *pk = this->generateSipPacket();
pk->setMsg("200 OK");
pk->setSeqNo(sip->getSeqNo());
pk->setSeqMethod(sip->getSeqMethod());
pk->setTo(sip->getFrom());
pk->setFrom(sip->getTo());
this->sendToUDP(pk, m_port, m_rgwAddress, 5060);
}
}
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else if (attack != NULL)
{
EV << "User under attack: ";
switch (attack->getType())
{
case 0: EV << "dummy"; break;
case 1: this->onAttackScan(attack); break;
case 2: this->onAttackExploit(attack); break;
case 3: this->onAttackFlooding(attack); break;
}
EV << endl;
}
}
C.2. Residential Gateway Module
void RGW::handleMessage(cMessage *msg)
{
if (msg->isSelfMessage())
{
if (msg == &m_timer)
{
this->bubbleNw("Ping response timeout - UA down");
m_vectorPingsTimeout.record(++m_numPingsTimeout);
// Report timeout to SEC
this->sendHeartbeatReport();
this->cancelEvent(&m_pingTimer);
}
else if (msg == &m_pingTimer)
{
// Send one OPTIONS ping to UA
this->sendPing();
m_vectorPingsSent.record(++m_numPingsSent);
// Schedule next ping timer
this->scheduleAt(simTime() + par("heartbeatInterval").doubleValue(),
&m_pingTimer);
// Schedule timeout timer in case UA is down
this->scheduleAt(simTime() + 1, &m_timer);
}
}
else
{
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this->handleIncomingMessage(msg);
}
}
void RGW::handleSipMessage(SipPacket *sip)
{
// Response to OPTIONS ping?
if(strcmp(sip->getMsg(), "200 OK") == 0 &&
strcmp(sip->getSeqMethod(), "OPTIONS") == 0)
{
this->bubbleNw("Received pong");
m_vectorPingResponsesRcvd.record(++m_numPingResponsesRcvd);
this->cancelEvent(&m_timer);
}
else
{
this->forwardToUA(sip);
}
}
void RGW::handleAttack(AttackPacket *attack)
{
m_vectorAttacks.record(++m_numAttacks);
// Scan attack packet
if (attack->getType() == 1)
{
m_vectorIdsDetections.record(++m_numIdsDetections);
m_datacollector->recordIdsDetection();
// Get source IP address from network layer
IpWithBlacklist *mIp = this->getIpModule();
IPAddress ip = mIp->getLastSourceAddress();
this->bubbleNw("IDS detected scanning activity");
this->sendSnortReport(ip.str().c_str());
}
// Exploit attack packet
else if (attack->getType() == 2)
{
// Check if signature is in database
for (VectorSigIt it = m_knownExploitSignatures.begin();
it != m_knownExploitSignatures.end(); it++)
{
EV << "Checking signature \"" << *it << "\" against " <<
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"payload \"" << attack->getPayload() << "\"" << endl;
// Compare attack signature to database of known signatures
if(strcmp(attack->getPayload(), *it) == 0)
{
this->bubbleNw("Exploit signature match");
m_vectorExploitSignatureHits.record(++m_numExploitSignatureHits);
m_datacollector->recordExploitSignatureHits();
delete attack;
attack = NULL;
break;
}
}
// Exploit signature has not been detected
if (attack != NULL)
{
m_vectorExploits.record(++m_numExploits);
m_datacollector->recordExploits();
}
}
// Forward all non-blocked attacks to UA
if (attack != NULL) this->forwardToUA(attack);
}
C.3. Event Correlation Module
void SEC::handleMessage(cMessage *msg)
{
if (!msg->isSelfMessage())
{
// Incoming message is either a Snort or a crash (heartbeat) report
ReportPacket *report = dynamic_cast<ReportPacket*>(msg);
if (report != NULL)
{
const int numUsers = this->getAncestorPar("numUsers").longValue();
// IDS report
if (report->getType() == 0)
{
this->getParentModule()->bubble("Received IDS report");
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m_vectorScanReports.record(++m_numScanReports);
if (m_numScanReports == par("scanReportsThreshold").longValue())
{
this->getParentModule()->bubble("Scan report limit reached");
m_numScanReports = 0;
// Send IP blacklist update to all users
for (int i = 0; i < numUsers; i++)
{
UpdatePacket *update = new UpdatePacket();
update->setType(0);
char buf[16];
snprintf(buf, 16, "%i",
IPAddress(report->getPayload()).getInt());
update->setPayload(buf);
update->setName("Backlist update");
snprintf(buf, 16, "users[%d].rgw", i);
this->sendToUDP(PK(update), m_port,
IPAddressResolver().resolve(buf), 5060);
}
}
}
// Heartbeat report
else if (report->getType() == 1)
{
this->getParentModule()->bubble("Received heartbeat report");
m_vectorCrashReports.record(++m_numCrashReports);
if (m_numCrashReports == par("crashReportsThreshold").longValue())
{
// Send signature update to all users
for (int i = 0; i < numUsers; i++)
{
// Create update packet for IDS/firewall on RGW
UpdatePacket *update = new UpdatePacket();
update->setType(1);
update->setPayload("Kphone vulnerable");
update->setName("IDS update");
char buf[16];
snprintf(buf, 16, "users[%d].rgw", i);
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this->sendToUDP(PK(update), m_port,
IPAddressResolver().resolve(buf), 5060);
}
}
}
}
delete msg;
}
}
SipPacket* SEC::generateUserNotification()
{
SipPacket* sip = new SipPacket();
sip->setFrom("unknown <sip:>");
sip->setTo("ua[0] <sip:100@10.0.0.1>");
sip->setSeqNo(1);
sip->setSeqMethod("MESSAGE");
sip->setMsg("MESSAGE");
std::string s("User notification text");
sip->setContentLength(s.length());
sip->setBody(s.c_str());
return sip;
}
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D. Heartbeat Monitor
void ssh_send(const char *msg)
{
if (msg == NULL) error("ERROR: invalid argument");
// Get current timestamp
char timestamp[32];
time_t secs;
struct tm *loctime;
secs = time(NULL);
loctime = localtime(&secs);
strftime(timestamp, 32, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", loctime);
char ssh_cmd[1024];
snprintf(ssh_cmd, 1024,
"ssh %s@%s echo \"%s %s is down >> /tmp/heartbeat_report\"",
SSH_USER, SSH_HOST, timestamp, PHONE_ID);
system(ssh_cmd);
}
int failed_response(int *failed)
{
// Increase failed counter and check against THRESHOLD
(*failed)++;
if (*failed >= THRESHOLD)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"Heartbeat failed %d times -> client down\n", *failed);
ssh_send("Heartbeat Failed");
*failed = 0;
}
}
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
int sockfd, bytes, failed;
char msg[512];
char buffer[1024];
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struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct hostent *server;
failed = 0;
// Construct OPTIONS message
strcat(msg, "OPTIONS sip:100@127.0.0.1 SIP/2.0\n");
strcat(msg, "Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 127.0.1.1:5061;branch=z9hG4bK;rport\n");
strcat(msg, "Content-Length: 0\n");
strcat(msg, "From: \"heartbeat\"<sip:100@1.1.1.1>;tag=c0a8320313c4\n");
strcat(msg, "Accept: application/sdp\n");
strcat(msg, "User-Agent: heartbeat\n");
strcat(msg, "To: \"sipphone\"<sip:100@1.1.1.1>\n");
strcat(msg, "Contact: sip:100@127.0.0.1:5061\n");
strcat(msg, "CSeq: 1 OPTIONS\n");
strcat(msg, "Call-ID: 289318289127391823\n");
strcat(msg, "Max-Forwards: 70\n\n");
// Get SIP server address
server = gethostbyname(HOST);
if (server == NULL) error("ERROR, no such host");
// Set address structure
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
memcpy(&addr.sin_addr.s_addr, server->h_addr, server->h_length);
addr.sin_port = htons(PORT);
// Create socket
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (sockfd < 0) error("ERROR opening socket");
// Connect to phone
if (connect(sockfd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0)
{
error("ERROR connecting to phone");
}
while (1)
{
// Send ping
bytes = write(sockfd, msg, strlen(msg));
if (bytes < 1) error("ERROR sending message");
// Receive pong (this is were an unopen SIP port is noticed)
bytes = read(sockfd, buffer, 256);
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if (bytes < 0)
{
failed_response(&failed);
}
else
{
failed = 0;
// Print response
printf("RESONSE:\n%s\n", buffer);
}
// Wait 10 seconds until next ping
sleep(PING_INTERVAL);
}
// Close socket
close(sockfd);
return 0;
}
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E. Honeypot
E.1. Configuration
sip = {
use_authentication = "yes"
domain = "localhost"
port = "5060"
user = "100"
useragent = "softphone"
secret = "F2DS13G5"
record_rtp = "yes"
}
services = {
serve = ["sip"]
}
E.2. Relevant VoIP Module Code (Python)
def parseSdpMessage(msg):
"""Parses an SDP message (string), returns a tupel of dictionaries
with {type: value} entries: (sessionDescription, mediaDescriptions)"""
# Normalize line feed and carriage return to \n
msg = msg.replace("\n\r", "\n")
# Sanitize input: remove superfluous leading and trailing newlines
# and spaces
msg = msg.strip("\n\r\t ")
# Split message into session description, and media description parts
SEC_SESSION, SEC_MEDIA = range(2)
curSection = SEC_SESSION
sessionDescription = {}
mediaDescriptions = []
mediaDescriptionNumber = -1
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# Process each line individually
if len(msg) > 0:
lines = msg.split("\n")
for line in lines:
# Remove leading and trailing whitespaces from line
line = line.strip(’\n\r\t ’)
# Get first two characters of line and check for "type="
if len(line) < 2:
raise SdpParsingError("Line too short")
elif line[1] != "=":
raise SdpParsingError("Invalid SDP line")
type = line[0]
value = line[2:].strip("\n\r\t ")
# Change current section if necessary
# (session -> media -> media -> ...)
if type == "m":
curSection = SEC_MEDIA
mediaDescriptionNumber += 1
mediaDescriptions.append({})
# Store the SDP values
if curSection == SEC_SESSION:
if type not in sessionDescriptionTypes:
raise SdpParsingError(
"Invalid session description type: " + type)
else:
sessionDescription[type] = value
elif curSection == SEC_MEDIA:
if type not in mediaDescriptionTypes:
raise SdpParsingError(
"Invalid media description type: " + type)
else:
mediaDescriptions[mediaDescriptionNumber][type] = value
return (sessionDescription, mediaDescriptions)
def parseSipMessage(msg):
"""Parses a SIP message (string), returns a tupel (type, firstLine,
header, body)"""
# Sanitize input: remove superfluous leading and trailing newlines
# and spaces
msg = msg.strip("\n\r\t ")
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# Split request/status line plus headers from body: we don’t care
# about the body in the SIP parser
parts = msg.split("\n\n", 1)
if len(parts) < 1:
logger.warn("SIP message is too short")
raise SipParsingError("SIP message is too short")
msg = parts[0]
# Python way of doing a ? b : c
body = len(parts) == 2 and parts[1] or ’’
# Normalize line feed and carriage return to \n
msg = msg.replace("\n\r", "\n")
# Split lines into a list, each item containing one line
lines = msg.split(’\n’)
# Get message type (first word, smallest possible one is "ACK" or "BYE")
sep = lines[0].find(’ ’)
if sep < 3:
raise SipParsingError("Malformed request or status line")
msgType = lines[0][:sep]
firstLine = lines[0][sep+1:]
# Done with first line: delete from list of lines
del lines[0]
# Parse header
headers = {}
for i in range(len(lines)):
# Take first line and remove from list of lines
line = lines.pop(0)
# Strip each line of leading and trailing whitespaces
line = line.strip("\n\r\t ")
# Break on empty line (end of headers)
if len(line.strip(’ ’)) == 0:
break
# Parse header lines
sep = line.find(’:’)
if sep < 1:
raise SipParsingError("Malformed header line (no ’:’)")
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# Get header identifier (word before the ’:’)
identifier = line[:sep]
identifier = identifier.lower()
# Check for valid header
if identifier not in shortHeaders.keys() and \
identifier not in longHeaders.keys():
raise SipParsingError("Unknown header type: {}".format(identifier))
# Get long header identifier if necessary
if identifier in longHeaders.keys():
identifier = longHeaders[identifier]
# Get header value (line after ’:’)
value = line[sep+1:].strip(’ ’)
# The Via header can occur multiple times
if identifier == "via":
if identifier not in headers:
headers["via"] = [value]
else:
headers["via"].append(value)
# Assign any other header value directly to the header key
else:
headers[identifier] = value
# Return message type, header dictionary, and body string
return (msgType, firstLine, headers, body)
class SipSession:
def __authenticate(self, headers):
global g_sipconfig
if not g_sipconfig[’use_authentication’]:
logger.debug("Skipping authentication")
return
logger.debug("’Authorization’ in SIP headers: {}".format(
’authorization’ in headers))
def sendUnauthorized(nonce):
msgLines = []
msgLines.append(’SIP/2.0 ’ + RESPONSE[UNAUTHORIZED])
msgLines.append("Via: " + self.__sipVia)
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msgLines.append("Max-Forwards: 70")
msgLines.append("To: " + self.__sipTo)
msgLines.append("From: " + self.__sipFrom)
msgLines.append("Call-ID: {}".format(self.__callId))
msgLines.append("CSeq: " + headers[’cseq’])
msgLines.append("Contact: " + self.__sipContact)
msgLines.append("User-Agent: " + g_sipconfig[’useragent’])
msgLines.append(’WWW-Authenticate: Digest ’ + \
’realm="{}@{}",’.format(g_sipconfig[’user’],
g_sipconfig[’domain’]) + \
’nonce="{}"’.format(nonce))
self.send(’\n’.join(msgLines))
if "authorization" not in headers:
# Calculate new nonce for authentication based on current time
nonce = hash("{}".format(time.time()))
# Send 401 Unauthorized response
sendUnauthorized(nonce)
raise AuthenticationError("Request was unauthenticated")
else:
# Check against config file
authMethod, authLine = headers[’authorization’].split(’ ’, 1)
if authMethod != ’Digest’:
logger.warn("Authorization method is not Digest")
raise AuthenticationError("Method is not Digest")
# Get Authorization header parts (a="a", b="b", c="c", ...) and put
# them in a dictionary for easy lookup
authLineParts = [x.strip(’ \t\r\n’) for x in authLine.split(’,’)]
authLineDict = {}
for x in authLineParts:
parts = x.split(’=’)
authLineDict[parts[0]] = parts[1].strip(’ \n\r\t"\’’)
logger.debug("Authorization dict: {}".format(authLineDict))
if ’nonce’ not in authLineDict:
logger.warn("Nonce missing from authorization header")
raise AuthenticationError("Nonce missing")
if ’response’ not in authLineDict:
logger.warn("Response missing from authorization header")
raise AuthenticationError("Response missing")
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# The calculation of the expected response is taken from
# Sipvicious (c) Sandro Gaucci
realm = "{}@{}".format(g_sipconfig[’user’], g_sipconfig[’domain’])
uri = "sip:" + realm
a1 = hash("{}:{}:{}".format(
g_sipconfig[’user’], realm, g_sipconfig[’secret’]))
a2 = hash("INVITE:{}".format(uri))
expected = hash("{}:{}:{}".format(a1, authLineDict[’nonce’], a2))
logger.debug("a1: {}".format(a1))
logger.debug("a2: {}".format(a2))
logger.debug("expected: {}".format(expected))
# Report authentication incident
i = incident("dionaea.modules.python.sip.authentication")
i.authenticationSuccessful = expected == authLineDict[’response’]
i.realm = realm
i.uri = uri
i.nonce = authLineDict[’nonce’]
i.challengeResponse = authLineDict[’response’]
i.expected = expected
i.report()
if expected != authLineDict[’response’]:
sendUnauthorized(authLineDict[’nonce’])
raise AuthenticationError("Authorization failed")
logger.info("Authorization succeeded")
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